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INTRODUCTION
Implied covenants1 are obligations that are not expressly imposed by 
a contract, but which courts nevertheless find are binding on one or more 
                                                                                                        
1. Portions of this Article draw on the author’s prior articles on implied 
covenants. See Keith B. Hall, Defining the Lessee’s Covenants to Drill and 
Develop a Lease, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Special Institute on 
Drafting and Negotiating the Modern Oil and Gas Lease (2018); Keith B. Hall, 
Implied Covenants and Changing Technology, Proceedings of the 60th Annual 
Mineral Law Institute (2013); Keith B. Hall, The Application of Oil & Gas Lease 
Implied Covenants in Shale Plays: Old Meets New, Proceedings of the 32nd 
Annual Energy and Mineral Law Institute (2011); Keith B. Hall, Implied 
Covenants: Claims Under Mineral Code Article 122, 57 ANNUAL MIN. L. INST.
(2010); Keith B. Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing 
Leased Lands, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010).
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parties to the contract.2 Courts routinely hold that oil and gas lessees are 
bound by several implied covenants. This Article reviews the various 
implied covenants that courts have recognized as binding on oil and gas 
lessees and examines the justifications for recognizing those covenants.
The Article then discusses various issues that sometimes arise in implied 
covenant disputes, including the remedies that are available, certain 
procedural issues, and the question of whether a lessee must continue to 
perform his implied contractual duties while a lawsuit over the validity or 
continuing existence of the lease is pending. Finally, the Article addresses 
the application of implied covenants in situations involving new 
technology and discusses the application of implied covenants in shale 
plays.
I. A PRIMER ON IMPLIED COVENANTS
Both within the oil and gas context and outside it, courts sometimes 
conclude that parties to a contract are bound by implied obligations.3 In oil 
and gas leases, however, implied obligations play a much larger role than 
they do in contracts generally. The “Primer” Section of this Article 
examines the reasons for this heightened role and provides the reader with 
background on the law of implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
A. History of and Justifications for Implied Covenants
For more than 100 years, courts have held that a mineral lessee’s 
duties include various implied covenants that are not expressly stated in a 
lease. The earliest case to recognize the existence of implied covenants 
may have been Stoddard v. Emery, an 1889 case in which the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court stated in dicta that oil and gas lessees are bound by an 
implied covenant to reasonably develop the leased premises.4 Three years 
later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again stated that a lessee was bound 
                                                                                                        
2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “covenant” as an agreement or promise, 
and an “implied covenant” as one which may reasonably “be inferred from the 
whole agreement and conduct of the parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 443 (9th 
ed. 2009).
3. An interesting case outside the oil and gas context is Wood v. Lucy, Lady 
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). The remainder of this Article cites 
numerous examples of cases within the oil and gas context.
4. 18 A. 339 (Pa. 1889); see also PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER,
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 802 (prominent commentators 
describing Stoddard’s dicta as being the origin of implied covenants). 
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by an implied covenant of reasonable development,5 and just a few years 
later, the same court held that lessees are bound by an implied covenant to 
protect the leased premises against drainage.6 Ohio soon followed suit in 
recognizing implied covenants,7 as did the United States Eighth Circuit in 
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,8 a decision which is recognized by several 
commentators as one of the leading cases on implied covenants.9 Today, 
every state with any significant amount of oil and gas jurisprudence has 
recognized the existence of implied covenants.10
Implied covenants exist with respect to contracts generally and are not 
unique to oil and gas leases. Indeed, in most states, the basic law of 
contracts provides that all parties are bound by an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.11 But that is a very general duty. With respect 
to oil and gas leases, courts hold that oil and gas lessees are bound by 
                                                                                                        
5. See McKnight v. Manufacturers Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892).
6. See Kempner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896). 
7. See, e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897) (recognizing 
implied covenants to reasonably develop the premises and to protect against 
drainage); see also Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). 
8. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
9. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802 (describing Brewster as 
“landmark” case); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 
2009) (describing Brewster as a “leading case”); Jacqueline S. Weaver, When 
Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing 
Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491, 492 n.6 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Bonds v. Sanchez O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 445-
46 (Ark. 1986); Garman v. Conoco, Inc. 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 154, n.42 (Tex. 2008); 
Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445 (Pa. 2001); Smith v. Amoco 
Production Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001); Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 
503, 507 (Mont. 1991); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464 S.E.2d 728, 733 (W. Va. 
1995); Meisler v. Gull Oil, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Ridl 
v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 789 (N.D. 1996); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 
N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897); Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 330 (Okla. 1994); 
Continental Oil Co. v. Blair, 397 So. 2d 538, 540 (Miss. 1981); Caddo Oil & Mining 
Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 717, 64 So. 684, 690 (1914).
11. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in court 
opinions from virtually every state, as well as in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205. An exception is Texas, 
which does not recognize a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, though it 
does recognize the existence of implied covenants in oil and gas leases. City of 
Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000) (no general duty of good 
faith and fair dealing); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 
S.W.3d 1, 18-19 (Tex. 2008) (discussing implied covenant to protect against 
drainage). 
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several implied covenants that include much more specific duties. Further, 
implied covenants seem to play a bigger role in the law of oil and gas 
leasing than in general contract law.
The reason that implied covenants play a more significant role in oil 
and gas leases than in some other contracts is probably due to a particular 
characteristic of oil and gas leases. Namely, because of the complexities 
and uncertainties involved in oil and gas exploration and development, 
leases seldom state how many wells the lessee will drill, when and where 
he will drill, or to what depth he will drill.12 Similarly, leases usually do 
not specify what a lessee will do to protect the leased premises against 
drainage or to market any product that is found. All these things are left to 
the discretion of the lessee, even though these aspects of the lessee’s 
performance are critical to the ultimate benefit that the lessor receives from 
the lease transaction (particularly given that a major part of the benefit 
allocated to the lessor is the right to a royalty based on production).13 One 
early commentator stated, “It is doubtful if any other character of legal 
instrument can be found in which one of the parties has so much 
potentially at stake with so little express contractual protection.”14 It is this 
characteristic of oil and gas leases that provides a “practical” explanation 
of why courts hold that lessees are bound by implied covenants.
Although implied covenants are universally recognized in U.S. oil and 
gas law, authorities have disagreed about the theoretical justification for 
such covenants. One theory is that a public policy favoring production of 
oil and gas is a valid justification for implied covenants.15 But two other 
                                                                                                        
12. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, 
Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST.
177, 194 (1976) (“Because there are many unknowns involved when the lease is 
executed, it is understood that much must be left to the judgment and discretion 
of the lessee.”); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1905) 
(noting impossibility of the lease itself stating how many wells should be drilled 
because that would depend “upon future conditions, which could not be 
anticipated with certainty” when the lease was entered).
13. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, 
Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST.
177, 194 (1976); see also Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants Claims Under Article 
122, 57 ANNUAL INST. ON MIN. L. 172, 173-74 (2010).
14. A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and 
Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV. 399, 399 (1933). 
15. See, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 779 
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Jacqueline L. Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law 
Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1489-90 
(1981); see also Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Bruce 
M. Kramer & Chris Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil & Gas 
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theories are more common.16 One of these more common theories is that 
implied covenants fill gaps in contracts, giving particularized expression 
to the parties’ own implicit intent. Thus, courts do not impose implied 
covenant obligations on lessee. Instead, the court merely finds the common 
intent of the parties. Under this theory, implied covenants are implied-in-
fact. The other common theory is that courts impose implied covenants on 
lessees as a means to promote fairness.17 Under this theory, implied 
covenants are implied-in-law.18
In the vast majority of cases involving implied covenant disputes, the 
theoretical basis of implied covenants is merely an academic question. The 
parties’ dispute will turn either on the scope and extent of the lessee’s 
implied covenant duties, on some procedural issue relating to implied 
covenants, or on some issue unrelated to implied covenants, not on 
whether the covenant at issue is implicit in the parties’ contractual intent 
or imposed as a matter of law by courts. Nevertheless, in rare cases, the 
theoretical basis of implied covenants will determine the resolution of a 
dispute. For example, in Smith v. Amoco Production Co., the court had to 
determine whether a lessee’s implied covenants were implied-in-law or 
implied-in-fact because, reasoned the court, a different statute of 
                                                                                                        
Leases: Some Needed Changes for the 80’s, 46 LA. L. REV. 787, 790 (1985); see 
also Taussig v. Goldking Properties Co., 495 So. 2d 1008, 1014 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (stating that the implied covenant of reasonable development serves public 
policy), writ denied, 502 So. 2d 111 (La. 1987).
16. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the 
Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10, at 9 (2002). 
17. See, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 455 (Pa. 
2001) (referring to fairness); see also David E. Pierce, Exploring the 
Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. §10, at 9 (2002). 
18. One oil and gas law treatise notes that there probably is some truth to both 
the implied-in-fact and implied-in-law theories. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 
4, at § 803. The same treatise states that implied covenants can be justified by the 
general principle of cooperation that exists in the contract law of most states. 
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802.1. But in Louisiana, the highest court 
has found a different justification. Although Louisiana recognizes an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that the implied duties in oil and gas 
leases are particularized expressions of Louisiana Civil Code article 2710’s 
requirement that a lessee use the “thing leased as a good administrator.” See Frey 
v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1992); see also LA. REV. STAT.
§ 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018).
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limitations would apply depending on whether the covenant was based on 
the implied intent of the parties or on a rule of fairness imposed by law.19
B. The Standard of Conduct for Compliance with Implied Covenants
With respect to implied covenant duties, lessees are not held to a 
fiduciary standard,20 and they are not required to exercise perfect 
judgment.21 On the other hand, a lessee’s discretion is not unfettered.
Courts universally hold that oil and gas lessees are required to act as 
reasonably prudent operators, taking into consideration both their own 
interests and those of their lessors.22 This modern description of the 
“reasonably prudent operator” standard is very similar to that stated in a 
1905 case that arose in Kansas, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc, Co.23 Brewster
stated, “Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of 
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both 
lessor and lessee, is what is required.”24
Depending on one’s viewpoint, the reasonably prudent operator 
standard is either the standard of conduct that applies when determining 
whether the lessee has complied with each one of several implied 
covenants to which lessees are bound, or the reasonably prudent operator 
standard itself is the sole implied covenant, though there are several 
different types of situations that recur with sufficient frequency that it is 
                                                                                                        
19. 31 P.3d 255, 265, 269-76 (Kan. 2001).
20. See, e.g., Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(under Illinois law, lessee does not owe fiduciary duties to lessor); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 31:122 (mineral lessee is not a fiduciary).
21. See Davis v. Ross Production Co., 910 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ark. 1995) 
(“due deference should be given to the judgment of the lessee,” but the lessee 
must exercise “sound judgment”); Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d 
1010, 1015 (Kan. 1990) (lessee must act as a reasonably prudent operator, but its 
actions should not be judged with the benefit of “hindsight”).
22. See Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); 
Appeal of Baird, 6 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 1939); Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co.,
80 S.E. 368, 370 (W. Va. 1913) (lessee must act as a reasonably prudent operator 
and consider interests of both itself and lessor); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 (mutual 
benefit and reasonably prudent operator standard).
23. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
24. Id. at 814. Although earlier implied covenant cases did not give as full a 
description of the standard now called the “reasonably prudent operator” standard, 
the standard imposed by those earlier cases also was one of reasonability. See, 
e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897) (recognizing “implied 
covenant that the lessee shall reasonably develop the lands and reasonably
protect” against drainage).
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useful to discuss the lessee’s implied duty in each of those types of 
situations as being a separate implied covenant. Thus, the text below 
discusses the lessee’s implied duties as being separate implied covenants.
C. The Most Commonly Recognized Implied Covenants
There is substantial similarity between the particular implied 
covenants recognized by different jurisdictions and various commentators.
Some of the implied covenants most frequently recognized in 
jurisprudence or commentary are covenants to: (1) promptly drill an initial 
test well; (2) reasonably develop the premises; (3) conduct further 
exploration; (4) protect against drainage; (5) diligently market minerals; 
and (6) restore the surface.25 Nevertheless, there are some differences in 
the implied covenants that different jurisdictions recognize.26
Further, different jurisdictions sometimes use different terminology to 
describe implied covenants that are the same in substance.27 For example, 
                                                                                                        
25. See, e.g., JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (6th ed. 
2014). Professor John Lowe states that common implied covenants include the 
duties to test, develop, explore, protect, and market. See id. at 313. He also 
mentions an implied covenant of diligent and prudent operation, though he notes 
that it largely overlaps other implied covenants. See id. at 348. 
The implied covenant of surface restoration also frequently is discussed in 
commentary. See e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas 
Leases—Past, Present and Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 658-60 (1994); Keith 
B. Hall, The Application of Oil & Gas Lease Implied Covenants in Shale Plays: 
Old Meets New, Proceedings of the 32 ANN. ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 304 (2011).
26. Some have recognized an implied covenant to restore the surface of the 
land to its original condition after the lease is complete. See Bonds v. Sanchez-
O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Ark. 1986), and some have rejected 
such an implied covenant. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc.,
893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005). Some courts have recognized an implied covenant of 
further exploration. See Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. 
App. 1984), while others have rejected such a duty. See Sun Exploration & 
Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989).
27. For example, Texas recognizes implied duties to develop the premises, 
protect the leasehold, and administer the lease. The duty to protect against 
drainage is included in the duty to protect the leasehold, and a duty to reasonably 
market oil and gas is part of the implied covenant to administer the lease. See 
Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001). Colorado recognizes 
four implied covenants: (1) to conduct exploratory drilling; (2) to develop the 
leased premises after discovering resources that can be profitably developed; (3) 
to operate diligently and prudently (which includes an implied covenant to 
market); and (4) to protect the leased premises against drainage. See Garman v. 
Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994).
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the Texas Supreme Court sometimes states that there are three implied 
covenants—covenants to (1) develop the premises, (2) protect the 
leasehold, and (3) manage and administer the lease.28 But a duty to protect 
against drainage is part of the general duty to protect the leasehold;29 a
duty to market is part of the duty to manage and administer the lease;30 and 
a duty to explore may be included in the duty to develop.31
1. Covenant to Drill a Test Well
Early in the history of the oil and gas industry, several courts held that 
a lessee had an implied duty to drill at least one test well on the leased 
premises relatively soon after the lease was executed.32 The courts reached 
this conclusion in part because many leases provided for only a nominal 
bonus, so that the lessor might receive virtually no benefit from the lease—
not even the benefit of someone having tested his land—in the event that 
the lessee did not drill. The absence of benefit to the lessor raised issues 
of fairness, as well as the possibility that the transaction constituted an 
illusory promise, unless the lessee had an implied duty to drill. But lessees 
often were not prepared to promptly drill, so they began drafting their 
leases to include delay rental clauses.33 These clauses provided that, if the 
                                                                                                        
28. Sun Exploration and Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 
(Tex. 1989); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
29. Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981); 
see also ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND 
GAS at 5-32 (2015 LexisNexis).
30. Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001); 
Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 n.1 (Tex. 1981); see 
also ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
at 5-5 (2015 LexisNexis).
31. Sun Exploration and Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 
(Tex. 1989); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959); see also ERNEST 
E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS at 5-30 thru 
5-31 (2015 LexisNexis).
32. See Gary B. Conine, Speculation Prudent Operation, and the Economics 
of Oil and Gas Law, 33 Washburn L.J. 670, 683 (1994); see also, LOWE, supra
note 25 at 202-3, 314 (4th ed. 2009); Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Littler, 70 N.E. 
363, 366 (Ind. 1904). 
33. See Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics 
of Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 684 (1994); Hite v. Falcon Partners,
13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 
F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2004). Lessees began using delay rental 
clauses early in the history of the oil and gas industry. For example, at least three 
reported cases from the author’s home state of Louisiana deal with leases granted 
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lessee had not begun drilling by the first anniversary of the granting of the 
lease, the lessee could pay “delay rentals” to defer or delay its obligation 
to drill a test well.34 Today, almost every lease contains a delay rental 
clause, unless the lease is a paid-up lease.35 Accordingly, the implied 
covenant to drill a test well is rarely litigated.36
2. Covenant to Reasonably Develop
The implied covenant of reasonable development requires the lessee 
to drill as many wells as are reasonably necessary to develop a proven 
formation—that is, a formation where drilling has confirmed the existence 
of oil or gas in paying quantities.37 The implied covenant of reasonable 
                                                                                                        
in early 1901 that contained delay rental clauses. See Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 
1023, 42 So. 489 (1906) (lease granted in March 1901); Jennings-Heywood Oil 
Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 119 La. 793, 44 So. 481 (1907) (lease 
apparently granted in early 1901); Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syndicate Co., 115 La. 107, 38 So. 932 (1905) (lease granted in 
1901); see also Saunder B. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1916) 
(leases granted in 1909); Busch-Everett v. Vivian Oil Co., 128 La. 886, 55 So. 
564 (1911) (lease granted in 1909). 
34. See, e.g., Kachelmacher v. Laird, 110 N.E. 933, 935 (Ohio 1915).
35. A “paid -up lease” is “[a] lease effective during the primary term without 
further payment of delay rentals, the aggregate of rentals for the entire primary 
term having been paid in advance.” PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, 8 
WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW 738 (2018) (hereafter, the “MANUAL OF 
OIL & GAS TERMS”). Sometimes a paid-up lease will include a delay rental clause 
and the lessee will simply pay all delay rentals at the start of the lease. Other times, 
the lease will not contain a delay rental clause, and the lease will state that it is a 
paid-up lease. Sometimes the lease will contain neither a delay-rental clause nor 
a statement that the lease is a paid-up lease, but this method of drafting a paid-up 
lease should be discouraged because a court might conclude that the implied 
covenant to test has not been negated. See infra Section III(A) of this Article.
36. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 812; see also Patrick H. 
Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market 
Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 177, 179 (1976) 
(“The implied covenant to drill an initial well is no longer of significance because 
the typical lease today terminates automatically if a well is not drilled or excused 
by delay rentals within a fixed period.”). 
37. Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 (Colo. App. 
2003); Wilds v. Universal Resources Corp., 662 P.2d 303, 306 (Okla. 1983); 
Clifton v. Koontz, 324 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tex. 1959); McKnight v. Manufacturers 
Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 
505 (Ohio 1897); Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 
1913); see LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (“Essentially, the relevant 
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development appears to be the first implied covenant to be recognized by 
courts,38 and it seems to be universally recognized. Because the duties 
associated with this implied covenant relate to proven formations, this 
covenant does not apply until after oil or gas is found in paying 
quantities.39 Further, because a reasonably prudent operator would not drill 
an unprofitable well merely to drain a proven formation more quickly, this 
implied covenant does not require a lessee to drill wells that likely would 
be unprofitable.40
The Louisiana Supreme Court described the implied covenant of 
reasonable development in 1914 in Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers’ 
Oil Co.41 The court stated:
It is an implied covenant of every lease of land, for the production 
of oil therefrom, that, when the existence of oil, in paying 
quantities, is made apparent, the lessee shall put down as many 
wells as may be reasonably necessary to secure the oil for the 
common advantage of both lessor and lessee. Whatever ordinary 
knowledge and care would dictate, as to the proper thing to be 
done for the interest of the lessor and lessee, under any given 
circumstances, is that which the law requires to be done, as an 
implied stipulation of this lease.42
                                                                                                        
cases hold that after production in paying quantities has been obtained from a 
mineral formation, it is the duty of the lessee to develop the producing formation 
in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator taking into consideration both its 
own interests and those of the lessor.”).
38. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802.
39. See Baker v. Collins, 194 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Ill. 1963) (“After the discovery 
of oil or gas in paying quantities, the law … implies a duty on the part of the lessee 
to reasonably develop the premises….”); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at §
832; see also LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (stating that, for both 
implied covenant to reasonably develop and implied covenant of further 
exploration, “there must be discovery in paying quantities to make the obligations 
operative.”); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 64 So. 684, 690 (La. 
1914).
40. 194 N.E.2d at 355 (there was a duty to develop “so long as the enterprise 
could be carried on at a profit”); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896) 
(lessee is not required “to put down wells that will not be able to produce oil 
sufficient to justify the expenditure”); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 832.
41. 64 So. at 690. 
42. See id. (quoting W. THORNTON, THE LAW RELATED TO OIL AND GAS §
111 (2d ed. 1904)).
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The implied covenant of reasonable development, as contemplated 
herein,43 does not in itself require the lessee to drill exploratory wells in 
unproven areas, though the lessee nevertheless may have a duty to do so 
in certain circumstances, as discussed in the next section.44
3. Covenant of Further Exploration
Some courts have held that lessees are bound by an implied covenant 
of further exploration that is a separate obligation from the implied 
covenant of reasonable development.45 Like the implied covenant of 
reasonable development, the implied covenant of further exploration does 
not apply until after oil or gas is discovered in paying quantities.46 But 
unlike the covenant of reasonable development, which requires a lessee to 
reasonably develop a proven formation, the implied covenant of further 
exploration applies to unproven areas.47 This implied covenant requires a 
lessee to conduct further exploration of unproven areas to the extent that a 
reasonably prudent operator would do so, taking into consideration the 
mutual benefit of the operator and lessor.48
Recognition of an implied covenant of further exploration is much 
more recent than the recognition of an implied covenant of recent 
development. Further, an implied covenant of further exploration is not as 
widely accepted as several of the other implied covenants. Perhaps the 
earliest significant discussion of an implied covenant of further 
exploration dates back to 1956, when a prominent commentator argued in 
a law review article that that an implied covenant of further exploration 
                                                                                                        
43. As noted in Section I(C)(3), courts do not always distinguish clearly 
between the duties of reasonable development and further exploration.
44. But see infra notes 50-53 and the accompanying text (noting that some 
courts have imposed duties to duties to explore in unproven areas—duties that 
commentators and other courts would describe as duties associated with an 
implied covenant of further exploration—even while characterizing the 
exploration duty as being included under the implied covenant of reasonable 
development).
45. See e.g., Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
46. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 841; see also LA. REV. STAT.
31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (stating that, for either the implied covenant to 
reasonably develop or the implied covenant of further exploration to apply, “there 
must be discovery in paying quantities to make the obligations operative”).
47. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018).
48. See Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
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exists, or should exist.49 Some other commentators promptly expressed 
disagreement,50 and controversy over this implied covenant continued 
over the decades.51 Further, relatively few courts have expressly 
recognized an implied covenant of “further exploration” by name.52
Nevertheless, the implied covenant of further exploration is more 
important than might be suggested by the relatively small number of courts 
that have expressly recognized such a covenant. First, this implied 
covenant is frequently discussed in commentary,53 which may influence 
courts and future litigants. Further, in addition to the courts that have 
expressly recognized an implied covenant of “further exploration” by 
name, several courts have applied other legal theories to reach results or 
impose duties similar to those one would expect by application of such an 
implied covenant. For example, some courts, including those in 
Oklahoma, have concluded that a lessee could be deemed to have 
abandoned its lease rights as to a portion of the leased premises that the 
lessee has not developed or explored for an extended period of time.54
Moreover, although commentators typically distinguish between an 
implied covenant of reasonable development and an implied covenant of 
further exploration, courts do not always clearly distinguish the duty or 
alleged duty at issue. For example, although the Texas Supreme Court has 
expressly rejected the existence of an implied covenant of further 
exploration by name,55 the language of the Court’s cases seems to suggest 
that the duty of “reasonable development” could include a duty to explore 
                                                                                                        
49. See generally Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration,
34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956); see also Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further 
Exploration: A Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 179 (1958).
50. See, e.g., Earl A. Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further 
Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1959).
51. See KUNTZ: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 62.1 
(discussing controversy over the existence and nature of the implied covenant of 
further exploration).
52. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372-73 (Colo. App. 1984) 
(expressly recognizing a duty for further exploration).
53. See, e.g., MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 841; see also Keith B. 
Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010).
54. See Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 253 P. 33, (Okla. 1927) (Recognizing 
abandonment of lease rights). But see Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 A.2d 
441, 449 (Okla. 1981) for a rejection of an “implied covenant of further 
exploration,” at least by name.
55. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959). 
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new areas.56 Indeed, some prominent commentators have concluded that 
Texas recognizes “the substance” of a duty to explore as part of the duty 
to reasonably develop.57 It may be difficult, though, for a lessor to prevail 
in a suit complaining about the failure of a lessee to drill a well to an 
unproven formation because the Texas Supreme Court has held that, in 
any reasonable development case, whether the lessor is complaining about 
the lessee’s failure to drill an additional well to a proven formation or an 
unproven formation, the lessor must prove that the undrilled well probably 
would have been profitable.58
In Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., the Ohio Supreme 
Court recently held that, “under Ohio law concerning oil and gas leases, 
there is no implied covenant to explore further separate and apart from the 
implied covenant of reasonable development.”59 The Court’s discussion 
can be read, however, as suggesting that a lessor would not be precluded 
from basing an alleged breach of an implied covenant of reasonable 
development on a failure to explore new formations. For example, the 
Court stated, “We also note that that the implied covenant of reasonable 
development is well suited to address the primary driver of the 
Landowners’ interest here, namely the emergence of new drilling 
technologies permitting production from deep strata that could not be 
obtained before.”60
Somewhat similarly, several Louisiana decisions arguably have 
imposed an obligation to explore unproven areas,61 even though the courts 
                                                                                                        
56. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND 
GAS at 5-31 thru 5-32 (2015 LexisNexis).
57. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 815.
58. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959). 
59. 95 N.E.3d 382, 388 (Ohio 2018).
60. Id. at 388 (The lessor originally had alleged breaches of an implied 
covenant of reasonable development and an implied covenant of further 
exploration. At the Ohio Supreme Court, the lessor chose to rely only on its theory 
that the lessee had breached an implied covenant of further exploration).
61. See Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants: Claims Under Mineral Code 
Article 122, Proceedings of the 57th Annual Mineral Law Institute (2010) at 183-
6 (noting that some commentators assert that Louisiana courts implicitly 
recognize a duty of further exploration, and that several decisions can be 
interpreted that way, but that there are certain ambiguities in this purported “line” 
of cases: one of the cases involved a lease with a clause that expressly requiring 
further exploration; two others made their statements about a duty to test in dicta; 
and, in one of the cases, Carter, there was testimony from which the court could 
have concluded that the area where no drilling had occurred was within a proven 
formation). See also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 845.4 (“Louisiana 
2019] IMPLIED COVENANTS AND THE DRAFTING OF OIL AND GAS LEASES 415
reached their decisions based on a duty that they characterized as a duty to 
“reasonably develop” the leased premises.62 Those who say that Louisiana 
recognizes an implied obligation of further exploration typically point to 
a line of cases headed by Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.63 In 
Carter, a fault crossed the leased premises. The lessee had drilled wells 
and developed the property on one side of the fault, but not the other. The 
lessor demanded that the lessee drill on the other side, but the lessee did 
not do so. The lessor sued for lease cancellation. The trial court granted 
partial cancellation, dissolving the lease as to the portion of the property 
that had not been developed. The lessee appealed the order of partial 
cancellation. The lessor did not appeal the trial court’s refusal to order 
complete cancellation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, after reviewing the evidence 
and concluding that it showed that a reasonably prudent operator would 
have drilled wells on the side of the fault that had not been developed.
Some of that evidence suggested that the proven field, which the lessee 
had developed on one side of the fault, likely existed on both sides of the 
fault. Thus, the Court could have simply based its decision on the lessee’s 
implied duty to reasonably develop a proven field of oil or gas after 
production from the field is established in paying quantities. But the 
Court’s opinion included the following language that suggested the 
existence of a duty to explore unproven areas:
The principle, as we understand it, is that development of every 
part of the lease is an implied condition. Therefore, whether the 
undeveloped portion be a single tract remote from the rest, or a 
consideration portion of a very large tract, or the east one hundred 
acres of a tract of 160, it is an implied condition that the lessee 
                                                                                                        
courts are probably the most severe in the country in enforcing an implied duty to 
explore further.”).
62. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt (WEST 2018); cf. Thomas A. Harrell, A
Mineral Lessee’s Obligations to Explore Unproductive Portions of the Leased 
Premises in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 387, 390 (1991) (noting that Louisiana 
courts have referred to the lessee’s obligation to reasonably “develop” the 
premises both when discussing the obligation to develop proven reservoirs and 
the obligation to explore non-productive areas). Indeed, the case that some 
commentators point to as being the leading case that establishes a duty of further 
exploration in Louisiana ─ Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26 
(1948) ─ refers to the issue in the case as being whether the lessee had reasonably 
developed the leased property.
63. 36 So. 2d 26 (1948). 
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will test every part.64
Such language, assuming it was not dicta, effectively imposed an implied 
duty of further exploration.
A question whose answer might vary by jurisdiction is whether a 
lessor who alleges a breach of an implied covenant to explore a new area 
must prove that the new area likely contains oil or gas in paying quantities.
It appears that such proof would be required in Texas.65 But an appellate 
court in Colorado stated that a plaintiff need not show that an exploratory 
well probably would be profitable.66 Instead, a plaintiff only needs to show 
that a reasonably prudent operator would drill an exploratory well.67 In 
states that require the plaintiff to prove that an exploratory well probably 
would have been profitable, that required element of proof makes it 
challenging for lessors to prevail in a claim that the lessee has breached a 
duty to conduct further exploration.
4. Covenant to Protect Against Drainage
The implied covenant to protect against drainage requires the lessee to 
take reasonable action to protect the leased premises against substantial 
drainage from wells on nearby properties.68 The implied covenant to 
protect against drainage is widely recognized, and it is one of the earliest 
of the implied covenants to be recognized.69 The implied covenant to 
                                                                                                        
64. See 36 So. 2d at 29 (quoting Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 253 P. 33 
(Okla. 1927), a case in which the issue was whether the lessee had abandoned a 
portion of the leased premises, and not whether a duty of further exploration 
existed or whether such a duty had been reached).
65. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959). 
66. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
67. Id.
68. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1, 
17 (Tex. 2008); Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 
(Colo. App. 2003); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464 S.E.2d 728, 733 (W. Va. 1995); 
Rogers v. Heston Oil Co., 735 P.2d 542, 546 (Okla. 1984); Klempner v. Lemon,
35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 505 (Ohio 1897); 
Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1913); Swope v. Holmes, 
124 So. 131 (La. 1929); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt.
69. Modern conservation statutes and regulations, such as well spacing rules, 
setback rules, and compulsory unitization can decrease the frequency of drainage 
disputes, but such disputes still can occur. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
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protect against drainage was recognized as early as 1896 in Pennsylvania70
and shortly thereafter in Ohio.71 The traditional way to protect the leased 
premises against drainage is to drill offset wells,72 though some courts 
have recognized that a lessee may be able to protect against drainage by 
seeking pooling or unitization.73 In some cases, spacing rules may prohibit 
the drilling of a well that would protect against drainage. In such a case, if 
the regulator will grant exceptions to the usual spacing rules, the lessee 
may have an obligation to seek such an exception.74 On the other hand, 
because a lessee is only required to take reasonable steps to protect against 
drainage, the lessee need not drill an offset well if it likely would be 
unprofitable to do so.75
In some states, if the lessee of the property being drained happens to 
be the operator of the neighboring well that is draining the lessor’s 
property, courts may hold the lessee to a higher standard of conduct than 
in cases in which the operator of the draining well is someone else, or 
courts may shift the burden of proof from the lessor to the lessee to show 
the reasonability of the lessee’s conduct.76 But other states do not appear 
                                                                                                        
70. See Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896).
71. See Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 Ohio (1897). 
72. See, e.g., Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); see LA. REV.
STAT. § 31:122 cmt.; Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 
415 (La. Ct. App.) (describing implied covenant to protect against drainage as 
being “actually an implied obligation to drill offset wells” when necessary to 
prevent drainage), writ denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964). One prominent treatise 
states that an offset well is “[a] well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the 
drainage of oil or gas to an adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled 
or is already in production.” MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 
684.
73. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 821; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. 
v. Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 n.57 (Tex. 2008); Southeastern 
Pipe Line Co. v. Tichauhek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999); Breaux v. Pan 
American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 418 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 165 
So. 2d 481 (La. 1964).
74. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981); Spaeth 
v. Union Oil Co., 710 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that Oklahoma 
law allows the Corporation Commission to authorize exceptions to spacing rules 
and stating that “Union had a duty, which it could not ignore, to seek 
administrative relief.”).
75. See Garza Energy, 268 S.W.3d at 14 n.42; Breaux, 163 So. 2d at 415 (to 
prove a breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage, the lessor must 
show that “it would have been economically feasible for the lessee to drill such 
offset wells”). 
76. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 336-37.
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to apply a heightened standard of conduct or to shift the burden of proof
in such a common-lessee situation.77
5. Covenant to Diligently Market
The implied covenant to market requires a lessee to diligently seek 
purchasers at a reasonable price for any oil or gas that is found in paying 
quantities.78 Disputes regarding this implied covenant most often involve 
natural gas, rather than oil.79 In part, this is because operators have fewer 
options for storing natural gas and transporting it to market than they have 
for storing and transporting oil. Oil can be shipped via pipeline, or it can 
be temporarily stored in tanks located near the well and then periodically 
transported to a market via trailer truck, railcar, or barge. In contrast, 
pipelines typically are the only practical option for transporting natural gas 
to market. Sometimes a connection to a pipeline will be readily available, 
but that is not always the case, and building entirely new pipelines or even 
long connections to existing pipelines can be expensive and time-
consuming.
The implied covenant to diligently market has at least two 
components. The first is a duty to diligently seek a buyer and a pipeline to
transport the gas to the buyer. The second is a duty to seek the best price 
reasonably available, though this duty is only triggered if the lease 
                                                                                                        
77. Id. at 416.
78. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 338-39; Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 
45 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1899); Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 3 So. 2d 289 
(La. 1941).
The implied covenant to market has been the subject of significant case law across 
the nation, as well as commentary by nationally prominent oil and gas scholars. 
See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Overriding Royalty 
Interests and Nonparticipating Royalty Interest, Whether Payable in Value or in 
Kind, Be Subject to the Same Valuation Standards as Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1 (2000); John S. Lowe, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation: The 
Role of the Implied Covenant to Market, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. SPECIAL INST. ON
PRIVATE OIL & GAS ROYALTIES, Chapter 6 (2003); Jacqueline S. Weaver, When 
Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing 
Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491 (1997); David E. Pierce, Exploring the 
Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST., Ch. 10 (2002); Bruce M. Kramer and Chris Pearson, The 
Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil & Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes for the 
80’s, 46 LA. L. REV. 788 (1986); Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied 
Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW.
LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 177 (1976).
79. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 853.
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provides for a royalty that is based on the sales price or the proceeds from 
sale.80 If the royalty is based on the market value, the duty to seek the best 
price reasonably available would not be triggered because the royalty 
owed to the lessor is independent of the price that the leaseholder actually 
obtains for the gas, and instead depends only on the market value. In some 
states, the marketing covenant has a third component—a duty for the 
lessee to absorb all post-production costs unless the lease makes it clear 
that the lessee is not solely responsible for those costs.
Traditionally, disputes regarding the implied covenant to market
concerned disagreements between the lessor and lessee regarding the first 
component of the marketing covenant, the lessee’s duty to be diligent in 
finding a buyer or in making connections to a pipeline so that the gas can 
be transported to market.81 Occasionally, disputes arose regarding the 
second component of the marketing covenant—the lessee’s duty to seek 
the best price reasonably available.
Disputes regarding the first two components of the marketing 
covenant still can arise, but another type of “marketing” dispute has often 
arisen in recent years. Many leases provide for a royalty to be paid based 
on the “value” of gas at the wellhead, but gas often is sold at a market quite 
a distance from the well. Further, gas at the wellhead sometimes is not 
suitable for immediate placement into a pipeline because the gas may 
contain impurities or be at too low a pressure. Operators often will incur 
significant expenses in treating the gas to bring its composition to pipeline 
specifications and in compressing the gas in order to put it into a pipeline 
and transport it to market. These steps cost money, but they also add value 
to the gas. And absent these steps, the gas often would not be marketable.
To determine the value of the gas at the wellhead for purposes of
calculating a royalty, operators generally have used a “net-back” or 
“workback” method.82 This method assumes that the value of gas at the 
wellhead is the price received for the gas when it is sold at market, minus 
the post-production (i.e., post-wellhead) costs that the operator incurs
between the wellhead and the place of sale. And, from a standpoint of 
                                                                                                        
80. Union Pacific v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex. 2003); Yzaguirre v. 
KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. 2001).
81. Id.
82. “Under this method costs of transportation, processing and treatment are 
deducted from the ultimate proceeds of sale of the oil or gas … to ascertain 
wellhead value.” See MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 1154. 
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economics, this makes sense.83 If sweet,84 dehumidified, high-pressure gas 
sells for $5 at a distant market, then sour,85 humid, low-pressure gas at the 
wellhead logically is worth $4 if the costs of treatment, dehydration, 
compression, and transport equal $1.
But lessors often have argued that the post-production tasks that an 
operator performs to gather, treat, dehydrate, and compress gas are all 
steps in the marketing of the gas.86 Therefore, their argue continues, unless 
the lease expressly states that the lessee may deduct the costs of these steps 
prior to calculating the royalty, the implied duty to market requires the 
lessee to absorb the costs and to pay royalties on the full sale price of the 
gas. Some courts have accepted such an argument,87 while others have 
rejected it.88 A rule that lessees are responsible for all post-production 
costs, up to the point that the gas becomes marketable, is sometimes called 
the first marketable product rule.89
                                                                                                        
83. See Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1997) (“Basic principles of economics require that, in determining the ‘gross 
proceeds at the wellhead’ in the absence of an actual sale of gas at the wellhead 
resulting in ascertainable gross proceeds, the gross proceeds from a sale elsewhere 
must be extrapolated, backwards or forwards, to reflect appropriate adjustments 
due to differences in the location, quality, or characteristics of what is being 
sold.”).
84. Sweet gas is natural gas with a relatively low hydrogen sulfide content.
85. Sour gas is natural gas with a relatively high hydrogen sulfide content.
86. For further discussion of such marketing disputes, see David E. Pierce, 
Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market,
48 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST., Ch. 10 (2002); David W. Hardymon, Adrift on the 
Implied Covenant to Market: Regulation by Implication, 24 ENERGY & MIN. L.
INST. 209 (2003).
87. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 897 (Colo. 2001) (lessor’s 
implied covenant argument prevails). 
In Oklahoma and Kansas, the implied covenant to market will require the operator 
to absorb post-production costs necessary to make natural gas marketable, but if 
the composition and pressure of the gas are such that the gas already is marketable, 
the lessee may deduct post-production costs for treatment and compression to the 
extent such costs are reasonable and add value to the gas. See Mittelstaedt v. Santa 
Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998); Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.,
894 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1995).
88. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Pa. 
2010) (rejecting lessors’ implied covenant to market argument, in addition to 
rejecting their arguments that were based on the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty 
Act); Poplar Creek Development Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC, 636 F.3d 
235 (6th Cir. 2011) (under Kentucky law, rejecting argument that implied 
covenant to market prohibited deduction of post-production costs).
89. MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 383.
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6. Covenant to Restore the Surface
The implied covenant to restore the surface requires the lessee to 
restore the leased premises to a condition reasonably approaching its 
original condition after the lease terminates, or perhaps after operations 
terminate in the area at issue.90 The implied duty of surface restoration is 
not widely recognized in jurisprudence, but Arkansas has recognized it,91
and it frequently is discussed in commentary.92 Texas and New Mexico 
appear to have rejected such a duty.93 Louisiana also has rejected an 
implied covenant of surface restoration—at least for cases in which the 
lessee’s conduct that caused the surface impacts was authorized by the 
lease and the use of the surface was not “excessive.”94
7. Other Implied Covenants that Might Exist
Some commentators have suggested that other implied covenants 
might exist, including covenants to use reasonable care in producing 
minerals (for example, to take sufficient care to avoid accidents)95 and to 
                                                                                                        
90. See Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases – Past, 
Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 640, 658 (1994).
91. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.,
151 S.W.3d 306, 310-12 (Ark. 2004); Bonds v. Sanchez-O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 
715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986).
92. See Martin, supra note 90, at 658; Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants: 
Claims Under Mineral Code Article 122, pp. 188-90 Proceedings of the 57th 
Annual Mineral Law Institute (2010); LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. The official 
comment to Louisiana Mineral Code article 122 suggests that, after the lease ends, 
a mineral lessee might have an implied obligation “to restore the surface of the 
lease premises as near as is practical to original condition.” Subsequent to 
enactment of the Mineral Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court had stated in dicta 
that such a duty exists, Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1999), 
and lower courts had held that such a duty exists. See, e.g., Edwards v. Jeems 
Bayou Production Co., 507 So. 2d 11, 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). But in 
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 
2005), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a general implied obligation to 
restore the surfaces does not exist under Louisiana law, at least in circumstances 
in which the lessee was authorized by the lease to conduct the activities that it did 
and the wear and tear on the property was not excessive.
93. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957); 
Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms, 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985).
94. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 
(La. 2005).
95. See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to 
Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL &
422 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
properly represent the lessor’s interests before state conservation 
agencies.96 These proposed implied covenants have not been recognized 
in jurisprudence, but neither have they been rejected, so perhaps a court 
would recognize such a duty under appropriate facts.97 But a court might 
reject an argument that implied covenants provide the basis for a 
contractual claim when accidents occur, and instead hold that a plaintiff’s 
claim sounds in tort only. And, in some states, a collateral attack rule might 
serve as a barrier to claims that a lessee did not adequately represent the 
lessor before regulatory authorities.98
D. Defenses, Remedies, and Other Issues
In some circumstances, lessees will have meritorious defenses to 
otherwise valid implied covenant claims. The following subsections of this 
Article first discuss some of the defenses that courts have recognized and 
then discuss some of the remedies that may be available in the event a 
lessor prevails on an implied covenant claim.
                                                                                                        
GAS INST. 177, 179 (1976). The proposed implied covenant to use reasonable care 
likely overlaps with negligence law. See id. at 179-80. Because the lessor would 
be able to recover in a tort action, there sometimes would be no reason for a court 
to determine whether a contractual duty was breached, though in some situations 
it might be necessary to reach that issue, as when the applicable limitations period 
depends on whether a plaintiff’s claim sounds in contract or tort.
96. Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases ─ Past, 
Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 660-1 (1994); see John M. McCollam, 
Impact of Louisiana Mineral Code on Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases, 22 MIN. LAW 
INST. 37, 68-9 (1975) (referring to a “possibly emerging obligation to represent 
the lessor’s interest fairly before regulatory agencies such as the Louisiana 
Commissioner of Conservation,” but stating “it is probably not correct to 
characterize this as a recognized implied obligation in Louisiana”).
Professor John Lowe states that common implied covenants include the duties to 
test, develop, explore, protect, and market. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 313. He 
also mentions an implied covenant of diligent and prudent operation, though he 
notes that it largely overlaps other implied covenants. See id. at 348. 
97. Courts have recognized, at least in dicta, that a lessee might be able to 
satisfy its duty to protect against drainage by appropriately seeking unitization. 
See Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 415 (La. App. 3d 
Cir.), writ denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964). Breaux also suggested that a lessee’s 
failure to seek unitization possibly could be a basis for liability. See 163 So. 2d at 
415. But few other cases suggest this possibility. See also McCollam, supra note 
96 at 68-9, 77-8.
98. See, e.g., Trahan v. The Superior Oil Co., 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983).
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1. Precluding Implied Covenants by Expressly Addressing Subject 
Courts will not impose an implied covenant that is expressly negated 
by the lease itself.99 Further, if a lease expressly imposes a duty of the same 
type that would be imposed by an implied covenant, courts generally will 
conclude that the parties intended the express duty to be the full extent of 
the lessee’s obligation with respect to that type of performance. Thus, even 
if the lease does not explicitly state that the express duty describes the full 
extent of the lessee’s obligation or that the lessee is not bound by an 
implied covenant, courts usually will reach that result. In other words, a
duty expressly imposed by the lease will generally not be supplemented 
by an implied covenant.100 The express duty implicitly negates any implied 
duty for the same variety of performance.
The most common lease clause that negates an implied covenant is the 
delay-rental clause, which negates the implied covenant to drill a test well.
Delay rental clauses generally are an example of implicit negation of an 
implied covenant. Delay rental clauses generally either impose a duty to 
drill or pay delay rentals within the first year (in an “or” clause) or state 
that the lease will terminate unless the lessee drills or pays delay rentals 
within the first year (in an “unless” clause”),101 but delay rental clauses 
generally do not state explicitly that the implied covenant to drill a test 
well is negated.
Express lease clauses also can be used to negate other implied 
covenants. For example, in Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi, the Texas 
Supreme Court held that an express lease clause negated the existence of 
an implied covenant to reasonably develop.102 The case involved two 
leases. One required drilling a well every sixty days after discovery of oil 
until a total of twelve wells were drilled. The second lease required drilling 
a well every ninety days until four wells were drilled. The lessee complied 
with those terms, but the lessor argued that the lessee had breached an 
implied covenant of reasonable development because a reasonably prudent 
                                                                                                        
99. Kachelmacher v. Laird, 110 N.E. 933, 935 (Ohio 1915).
100. See Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 44 A. 555, 556 (Pa. 1888) (“where the 
parties have expressly agreed on what shall be done, there is no room for the 
implication of anything not so stipulated for”); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 
502, 505 (Ohio 1897) (“The implied covenant arises only when the lease is silent 
on the subject.”); Lundin/Weber Company LLC v. Brea Oil Company, Inc., 11 
Cal Rptr. 3d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W. 
2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
101. See LOWE, supra note 25 at 204-06 (discussing “or” clauses and “unless” 
clauses).
102. 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. 1937).
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operator would drill several more wells than the lessee had drilled. A jury 
granted a verdict to the lessor, but the appellate court reversed, and the 
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court judgment, holding that 
the existence of an express clause imposing certain duties to develop 
precluded the existence of an implied covenant to reasonably develop.103
Thus, the express duty implicitly negated an implied covenant of 
reasonable development.
In Lundin/Weber Company LLC v. Brea Oil Company, Inc., a
California court held that express drilling duties stated in a lease negated 
any implied covenant of further exploration.104 Two leases were at issue.105
The first lease stated that the lessee would drill ten wells each year for the 
first four years of the lease, and that each well would be drilled to a depth 
of at least 1,000 feet, unless oil was discovered in paying quantities at a 
shallower depth.106 The second lease provided that, once the lessee
commenced drilling operations, it would “prosecute the drilling of a well 
or wells with reasonable diligence until oil or gas . . . is found in quantities 
deemed paying.”107 The lease discussed the lessee’s duty to execute partial 
releases of the lease and required the lessee to “reasonably develop the 
acreage retained” after oil or gas was discovered in paying quantities, but 
the lease also stated that the lessee would “in no event be required to drill 
more than one well per ten” acres of area capable of producing oil or 160
acres of area capable of producing gas.108
The lessor argued that the lessee breached a duty of further exploration 
by not drilling more wells to a depth of 3,000 feet.109 The court rejected that 
argument and concluded that the terms of the two leases expressly imposed 
a duty of exploration that existed up until the time oil or gas was found in 
paying quantities, after which an expressly delimited duty of reasonable 
development existed. Given that the leases expressly imposed duties of 
exploration that existed up until oil or gas was found in paying quantities, 
the court would not impose an implied duty of further exploration for the 
period after oil or gas was discovered in paying quantities.110
                                                                                                        
103. Id.
104. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Because the court determined 
that the express lease terms would negate an implied covenant, the court did not 
reach the issue of whether California would recognize an implied covenant of 
further exploration.
105. See id. at 769.
106. See id. at 772-3.
107. See id. at 774.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 770.
110. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 774-75.
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In Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., a Michigan court concluded that the 
express terms of a lease precluded an argument that an implied covenant to 
market barred use of the “work back” method to calculate royalties.111 The 
lease stated royalties would be a specified fraction of “gross proceeds at the 
wellhead” or “the prevailing market rate at the wellhead.”112 The lessor 
argued that an implied covenant to market required the lessee to absorb post-
production costs.113 The court disagreed. The court stated that, assuming 
Michigan recognized an implied covenant to market,114 the covenant would 
not apply whenever the lease expressly addresses a subject.115 The court 
reasoned that the royalty clause expressly addressed how royalties should 
be calculated, and that the lease’s “at the wellhead” language should be 
interpreted as allowing use of the work back method whenever gas is sold 
at a distance from the well, rather than at the wellhead.116
As for the duty to protect against drainage, numerous cases deal with 
the effect of a lease clause that expressly imposes duties to drill offset 
wells.117 Most of the clauses require the lessee to drill an offset well if a 
productive well is located on nearby land, within a specified distance of 
the leased premises. Such a clause might expressly require the lessee to 
drill an offset well if a productive well is located within 150 feet of the 
leased premises.118 But such clauses typically do not expressly address 
whether the lessee has any duty to drill an offset well if a well on nearby 
property is located further than the specified distance. This leads to the 
question of whether the lessee is bound by both the express covenant and 
an implied covenant to protect against drainage, or whether the express 
covenant precludes the existence of an implied covenant. If the logic of 
the three cases noted above—Kishi, Lundin/Weber, and Schroeder—
applies in the context of an express offset well covenant, such an express 
covenant would preclude the existence of an implied covenant to protect 
against drainage. And that is the result a Texas appellate court reached in 
Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.119
                                                                                                        
111. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
112. See id. at 890.
113. See id. at 891.
114. The court did not reach the issue of whether such a duty exists under 
Michigan law. See id. at 895-96.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 894.
117. See generally, discussion at MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3.
118. See, e.g., Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 174 (5th 
Cir. 1970).
119. 161 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App. 1942). Other Texas cases have 
suggested that the express offset clause only applies during the primary term, 
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But in other cases, courts have reached contrary results, particularly if 
the lessee that is accused of breaching an implied covenant to protect 
against drainage is also the operator of the draining well on the 
neighboring property. For example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, the 
Texas Supreme Court held that, if a leased premises is being drained, an 
express offset well covenant will not preclude the existence of an implied 
covenant to protect against drainage if the lessee is the operator of the 
draining well on the neighboring property.120 In Stansbury, the Court 
expressly rejected Hutchins to the extent that Hutchins suggested that an 
express offset clause would preclude a lessor’s implied covenant claim 
against his lessee if the lessee also was the operator of the draining well.
Similarly, a California appellate court concluded that an express offset 
well would not preclude the existence of an implied covenant to protect 
against drainage if the lessee of the premises being drained was also the 
operator of the draining well on the neighboring tract.121 In Williams v. 
Humble Oil & Refining Co., the United States Fifth Circuit concluded that 
this would also be the result under Louisiana law.122 Similarly, in Millette 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that 
an express offset well covenant would preclude an implied covenant to 
protect against drainage, but that if the lessee was the operator of the 
draining well, the lessee would be liable for breach of an implied covenant 
that he do nothing to impair the value of the lease.123
Further, in certain cases, particularly when offset well covenants are 
triggered only by wells that are closer to the leased premises than would 
generally be allowed under spacing rules, some courts and commentators 
seem to believe it would be unfair to allow such a clause to implicitly 
negate an implied covenant to protect against drainage.124 They reason that 
a prospective lessor who reads a proposed lease containing such a clause 
might understand the clause as imposing an extra duty on the lessee, when 
the primary effect, assuming the express clause is allowed to implicitly 
negate any implied covenant to protect, actually will be to decrease the 
                                                                                                        
though it is not clear why this would be so. See also Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d 
932 (Tex. App. 1957); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691, 693 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
120. 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1967).
121. R.R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 158 P.2d 754 (Cal. App. 
158 P.2d 754 (Cal. App. 1945).
122. 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
123. 48 So. 2d 344 (Miss. 1950). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 
72 So. 2d 176 (Miss. 1954).
124. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3; see also Williams v. 
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 174 (5th Cir. 1970).
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lessee’s duties.125 Those authorities believe that an implied covenant to 
protect against drainage should co-exist with the express duty, assuming 
the lease does not explicitly negate an implied obligation. 
Relatively few leases expressly negate the existence of an implied 
covenant to protect against drainage, but courts and commentators have 
stated that, whenever the parties have agreed to a clause that expressly 
negates or limits an implied covenant to protect against drainage, the 
clause should be enforced.126
2. Demand and Opportunity to Cure
Before filing suit based on an alleged breach of an implied covenant, 
a lessor sometimes must give the lessee a notice of the alleged breach and 
a reasonable time to cure the breach. In Louisiana, for example, the 
Mineral Code requires a lessor to provide the lessee with written notice of 
an alleged breach, and a reasonable opportunity to cure it, before filing a 
suit based either on drainage or the lessee’s alleged failure to develop and 
operate the leased premises as a prudent operator.127
In most other jurisdictions, case law makes notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a suit seeking an order terminating the 
lease as a remedy for a breach of implied covenants.128 Those jurisdictions 
                                                                                                        
125. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3.
126. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623, 630 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Beaumont 1966), writ refused n.r.e., 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1966) (“A 
lessor and lessee may contract so that a lessee is never under obligation to drill an 
offset well. To so contract, however, the language must be very clear.”); MARTIN 
& KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3 (“No one would object to enforcing a clause 
that stated that lessee is not obligated to offset wells more than 150 feet from 
boundary lines.”); Linn v. Wehrle, 35 Ohio App. 107, 109, 172 N.E. 288, 289 (5th 
Dist. 1928).
127. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:136; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 31:135 & cmt. 
Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that Mineral Code article 136 does 
not require the lessor to provide notice and an opportunity to cure as a perquisite 
to a suit seeking restoration of the land. 
128. See e.g., Smith v. Tull, 43 P.2d 84, 85 (Okla. 1935); Hayes v. Equitable 
Energy Resources Co., 266 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Kentucky law).
Arkansas courts do not make notice and an opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a 
suit for lease cancellation. See Davis v. Ross Production Co., 910 S.W. 2d 209, 
212-13 (Ark. 1995). But the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated, if a lessor does 
not give pre-suit notice and an opportunity to cure, a conditional order of 
cancellation, giving the lessee an opportunity to cure, is preferable to an order of 
outright lease cancellation. See Roberson Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller Land and 
Lumber Co., 700 S.W. 2d 57, 58 (Ark. 1985).
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do not necessarily make notice and opportunity to cure a prerequisite to an 
action for damages, but lease termination is such a commonly-sought 
remedy for alleged breaches of implied covenants that notice and an 
opportunity to cure effectively become a prerequisite in most implied 
covenant cases. The rationale for requiring notice and an opportunity to
cure as a prerequisite for the remedy of lease termination is that such 
termination can be a harsh remedy. Further, unless the lease itself 
expressly provides for termination in the event of a breach, termination is 
an equitable remedy,129 rather than a legal remedy, and equity “abhors a 
forfeiture.”130 Moreover, if a person seeks equity, that person must act 
equitably, and it is fair for the lessor to give the lessee an opportunity to 
cure a breach before seeking lease termination.
Depending on the language of the particular lease, a requirement that 
the lessor give notice and an opportunity may be a prerequisite to any suit 
by the lessor that is based on an alleged breach of express or implied terms 
of the lease, or the clause may make it a prerequisite only for certain types 
of claims or claims seeking certain types of relief, such as lease 
termination. If the lease requires notice and an opportunity to cure, the 
lessor typically must demand that the lessee cure the alleged breach. If the 
lessor sends the lessee a letter that simply inquires about a matter, or the 
lessor sends a notice asserting that the lease has terminated because of an 
alleged breach, such a communication probably will not satisfy the 
requirement for notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure.131
Finally, it should be noted that some leases contain a judicial 
ascertainment clause. Such clauses typically provide that a lease cannot be 
terminated as a remedy for a breach of an implied covenant until the lessee 
has been given a reasonable opportunity to cure after a court determines 
that the lessee was in breach of an implied covenant. In the absence of such 
a clause, lessees sometimes can find themselves in a difficult situation.
Suppose the lessor alleges a breach of an implied covenant to reasonably 
develop and demands that the lessee cure the alleged breach by drilling 
one or more wells, which will be very expensive. Further, suppose that 
                                                                                                        
129. ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. 
2010); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 39 P.3d 577, 583 (Idaho 2001); Columbus Hotel 
Co. v. Pierce, 692 So. 2d 605, 609-10 (Miss. 1993); Ionno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 
443 N.E.2d 504, 509 (Ohio 1983).
130. See, e.g., Fisher v. Heirs and Devisees of T.D. Lovercheck, 864 N.W.2d 
212, 217 (Neb. 2015); Wagner & Brown Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 429 
(Tex. 2008); Columbus Hotel Co. v. Pierce, 629 So. 2d 605, 609 (Miss. 1993); 
Thurner v. Kaufman, 699 P.2d 435, 438 (Kan. 1985) (referring to “the oft-
repeated maxim that ‘equity abhors a forfeiture’”).
131. See Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W. 2d 784, 788 (N.D. 1996).
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there exists a good faith disagreement regarding whether the lessee has 
breached an implied covenant, but the lease is valuable, and the lessee does 
not want to risk litigation because, if it loses the litigation, the court may 
award lease termination. A judicial ascertainment clause can save the 
lessee from that dilemma by giving it the option to defend a suit alleging 
a breach of an implied covenant without risking losing the lease.132
3. The Effect of a Lessor’s Unsuccessful Suit Seeking Lease 
Cancellation
Some courts have held that a lessee’s duty to perform is suspended 
pending resolution of the lessor’s allegation that the lease has terminated.133
Such a rule sometimes is called the repudiation doctrine. The doctrine is 
based on fairness and equity. A lessee should not be expected to spend 
money on drilling additional wells at the same time that the lessor is seeking 
a court ruling that the lease has terminated.134 Accordingly, if the lessor fails 
to obtain lease termination based on his original complaint, the lessor should 
not then be allowed to pursue an argument that the lease should be 
terminated based on the fact that the lessee was not drilling additional wells 
while the lessor’s original complaint was pending. The repudiation doctrine 
is widely recognized, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected 
it.135
                                                                                                        
132. For a thorough discussion of judicial ascertainment clauses, see PATRICK 
H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, 5 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW, §§
682-682.5.
133. See e.g., Coasted Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 
20 (Tex. 2008); Lewis v. Kansas Production Co., Inc., 199 P. 3d 180, 187 (Kan. 
App. 2009).
134. If a lease already has terminated, or if it never was valid, then the putative 
lessee is at substantial risk if he drills more wells. He will be required to account 
to the lessor for all production. Further, even if the well is successful and he has 
to turn the well over to the plaintiff, the putative lessee might not be entitled to 
reimbursement for his drilling costs. And if the putative lessee drills a dry hole, 
he might even be liable for damages for having reduced the leasing value of the 
property by drilling a well that shows the property is not a good prospect for 
mineral production. Greer v. Carter Oil, 25 N.E.2d 805, 810-11 (Ill. 1940) (noting 
the possibility of a damages claim for reduced value of property for mineral 
leasing if a company that lacks an enforceable lease drills a dry hole), cf. Layne 
Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So. 2d 20, 22 (1946) 
(upholding damage for land’s reduced value for mineral leasing after a company 
conducted seismic operations without authority and those operations showed the 
land was a poor candidate for drilling).
135. Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 110 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2015).
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4. Issues of Law vs. Fact and the Burden of Proof
The question of whether a particular implied covenant exists generally 
will be a matter of law.136 The question of whether a lessee has breached 
an implied covenant is an issue of fact.137 The lessor generally has the 
burden of proving that the lessee had breached an implied obligation of 
the lease.138 Nevertheless, some courts have suggested that the burden of 
proof might be placed on the lessee to show the reasonability of his 
conduct if he is accused of breaching the implied covenant to protect 
against drainage and the lessee happens to be the operator of the well on 
neighboring property that is draining the leased premises.139
                                                                                                        
136. See, e.g., Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So.
2d 789 (La. 2005) (discussing whether an implied obligation to restore surface 
exists as a matter of Louisiana law). 
137. See Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948); 
Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers’ Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 717, 64 So 684, 690 
(1914).
138. Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 138-39 (Colo. 
App. 2003); Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 105, 9 So.
2d 473, 475-76 (1942) (lessor has burden of proving a breach of the implied 
obligation to protect against drainage); Saulters v. Sklar, 158 So. 2d 460, 463 (La. 
App. 2nd Cir. 1963) (lessor plaintiff had burden of proving lessee had not 
reasonably developed the premises).
139. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 336-37.
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5. Remedies Available
The potential remedies available for breach of an implied covenant 
include: (1) monetary damages;140 (2) conditional cancellation;141 (3) 
partial cancellation;142 (4) complete cancellation;143 and (5) specific 
                                                                                                        
140. Clovis v. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 345 P.2d 729, 731 (Colo. 
1959); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio, 1897). Damages awards 
are not common in implied covenants cases because it often is difficult to prove 
the amount of damages. See Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 
371372 (W. Va. 1913) (referring to “the impossibility of adequate proof of the 
extent” of injury); see also Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 
406, 414-16 (La. App.), writ denied, (La. 1964); LA. REV. STAT. 31:136 (referring 
to the possibility of a damages award); Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 
432 F.2d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1526 (1971). See also 
Coasted Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 18-19 (Tex. 2008) 
(discussing in dicta what would be the appropriate measure of monetary damages 
for a breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage).
See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. 
2008) (citing cases and discussing three possible measures of damages for breach 
of the implied covenant to protect against drainage). 
141. When a court awards conditional cancellation, it orders that the lease will 
be cancelled (in whole or part) unless the lessee renders a particular performance 
within a stated time. See, e.g., Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); see 
Roberson Enters. v. Miller Land Lumber Co., 700 S.W. 2d 57, 58 (Ark. 1985) 
(referring to conditional cancellation as a possible remedy); Stubbs v. Imperial 
Oil & Gas Co., 164 La. 689, 695, 114 So. 595 (1927); Cutrer v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co., 202 F. Supp 568, 572-73 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 309 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 
1962), cert. denied, 83 S. Ct. 883 (1963). 
142. Often, if a lessee has one or more productive wells, but it has not 
reasonably developed or adequately explored the remainder of the leased 
premises, a court may allow the lessee to retain the lease as to some modest 
acreage around each productive well, while ordering lease cancellation as to the 
remainder of the leased premises. See, e.g., Robinson v. Miracle, 293 P. 211 
(Okla. 1930); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896) (court orders a 
conditional, partial cancellation); LA. REV. STAT. § 30:142; Eota Realty Co. v. 
Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74 So. 2d 30 (1954) (lessee’s failure to develop part 
of leased premises only justified cancellation of lease as to the portion that had 
not yet been developed); see also Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 237 La. 1015, 
1030-1, 112 So. 2d 695, 701 (1959) (awarding partial cancellation).
143. See Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 372 (W. Va. 1913). 
Complete cancellation is considered a harsh remedy, but it sometimes is granted. 
For a case noting that cancellation is a harsh remedy, see St. Luke’s United 
Methodist Church v. CNG Development Co., 663 S.E.2d 639, 644 (W. Va. 2008); 
see also Robbins V. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Kan. 1990) (“As 
a general rule, forfeiture of oil and gas lease for breach of an implied covenant is 
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performance.144 The most common remedies probably are the various 
forms of lease cancellation—total, partial, and conditional. Lease 
cancellation can be harsh, and generally it is disfavored, but it sometimes 
is the most practical remedy. Further, if notice and cure are required, this 
somewhat mitigates the harshness of cancellation, particularly if 
conditional cancellation is used in circumstances where the lessee had a 
good faith argument that it was not in breach. A damages award would be 
preferable to lease cancellation, but it is often difficult or impossible to 
quantify the damages that result from the breach of an implied covenant.
And courts generally are unwilling to order specific performance of tasks 
as complex as those involved in complying with implied covenants.
In an interesting, recent development, a few cases from Ohio have 
issued rulings holding either that an oil and gas lease is not subject to 
partial abandonment by depth or that that partial termination by depth is 
not a permissible remedy for an alleged breach of an implied covenant.145
On the other hand, courts in other jurisdictions have been willing to 
order, or at least consider, partial terminations by depth. For example, in a 
1962 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that 
granted a termination of a lease as to certain depths for 120 of the 160 
acres covered by a lease.146 Because only the lessor appealed the lower 
                                                                                                        
disfavored.”); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:142 (stating in part that, “A mineral lease may 
be dissolved partially or in its entirety.”).
144. Courts generally are unwilling to order specific performance unless the 
performance required is can be commanded in a straightforward order, such as an 
order to deliver property. Given that a lessee’s duties under implied covenants 
involve more complex obligations, such as an obligation to drill a well, an order 
of specific performance rarely will be appropriate as a form of remedy for breach 
of an implied covenant. See LA. REV. STAT. 31:134 cmt. (stating that specific 
performance may be awarded in appropriate circumstances, but also stating that 
“[m]andatory injunctions may be unavailable in some instances, such as a request 
that a lessee be compelled to drill a well”).
145. Beer v. Griffith, 399 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ohio 1980). See also Cable v. 
Cubbon, 5 Ohio Law Abs., 1926 WL 2884 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 1926); 
Hartline v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties, Inc., 2017 WL 1014377 (S.D. Ohio 
2017) (forfeiture was not an available remedy for alleged breach of oil and gas 
lease because lease provided for forfeiture in some circumstances, but did not 
expressly provide for forfeiture for the type of breach alleged, and lessors did not 
assert that damages would be an inadequate remedy; note that court seemed to 
erroneously refer to termination of lease upon certain conditions as a forfeiture, 
as opposed to a termination of a lease by its own terms).
146. Barnes v. Mack Oil Co., 376 P.2d 279, 280 (Okla. 1962). In prior 
decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had declined to order partial termination 
based on depth, but had suggested that such relief could be granted under 
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court judgment, the decision demonstrates only that a lessee’s breach of 
implied covenant duties as to certain depths does not entitle the lessee to a 
cancellation of the lease as to all depths. The case does not authoritatively 
establish that lessees have no basis to complain about partial terminations 
by depth. But nothing in the decision suggests that the court thought that 
a partial termination by depth was inappropriate.
E. Is There an Implied Covenant to Use New Technology?
The technology used in oil and gas exploration and development 
evolves continuously. In 1859, Edwin Drake drilled the first oil well in the 
United States. He chose the drill site based on the proximity of natural 
seeps, and he used a cable tool rig to drill. He found oil at a depth of about 
69½ feet. His workers were a blacksmith, whom Drake hired because the 
blacksmith had experience making tools for persons who drilled water 
wells, and the blacksmith’s sons.147
Today, companies use high-speed computers to process complex 
seismic data in order to create three-dimensional maps of subsurface 
geology. Companies can begin drilling vertically, and then turn the 
direction of drilling to proceed diagonally or even horizontally. They often 
drill to depths tens of thousands of feet beneath the surface and drill on the 
outer continental shelf, sometimes in water that is a mile deep. They can 
fracture formations that have low permeability in order to release oil or 
gas found in the pore spaces of such formations, and they also can use 
sophisticated secondary and tertiary recovery techniques in order to 
produce more oil than could be produced using only primary recovery. 
The technology is very sophisticated, and workers are often well-trained 
and experienced.
Such technology can increase the likelihood of finding oil or gas, 
increase the total ultimate recovery from a reservoir, increase the rate of 
recovery, and make it economical to drill in circumstances in which 
drilling otherwise would not be economical. This raises a question: Are 
lessees bound by an implied covenant to use new technology as it is 
developed?
If the question is taken literally, the correct answer clearly is, “No.” A
lessee does not have a duty to use new technology for the sake of using 
new technology. Accordingly, there is no “implied covenant to use new 
technology.” But new technology can help a lessee operate more 
                                                                                                        
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., McKenna v. Nichlos, 145 P.2d 957, 960 
(Okla. 1944).
147. Daniel Yergin, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND 
POWER 27 (1991).
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effectively. Thus, a lessee who does not use new technology might not 
perform as effectively as operators who use newer technology. Further, 
implied covenants require a lessee to perform certain functions to the same 
extent that a reasonably prudent operator would. Accordingly, a better 
question might be whether there can be circumstances in which an operator 
who performs as effectively as reasonably can be expected using the 
technology that existed at the time the lease was executed can be liable for 
a breach of one of the traditional implied covenants if the use of newer 
technology would allow such an operator to perform better. This issue has 
not been addressed extensively in jurisprudence or commentary, but the 
answer seems to be that an operator can be liable in such circumstances.
Two of the leading cases on this issue are from Louisiana. In Wadkins 
v. Wilson Oil Co., the plaintiffs granted a mineral lease that covered forty
acres of land.148 For the first several years after the plaintiffs granted the 
lease to the defendant in 1923, the defendant operated as diligently as other 
operators who held leases in the same general area. The plaintiffs’ land 
contained two existing wells. The defendant produced oil from those two 
wells until the wells quit producing. The operator then plugged the two 
wells back to a shallower chalk formation, re-perforated both wells, and 
successfully put one of the two wells back into production. The defendant 
also drilled four additional productive wells into the same chalk formation 
on the leased premises, so that there were five producing wells on the forty
acres.
The five wells were still producing oil in 1941, but their rates of 
production had decreased. Other operators in the same general area were 
getting much higher production rates from the same chalk formation by 
drilling new wells and acidizing them.149 Experience in the area had shown 
that acidizing did not work as effectively on existing wells as on new 
wells, so it was necessary to drill new wells to get the full benefit of 
acidizing. The plaintiffs demanded that the defendant drill new wells, but 
the defendant declined to do so. The plaintiff sued for lease cancellation 
                                                                                                        
148. Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720 (La. 1942).
149. “Acidizing” has been defined as “a well stimulation technique used 
primarily on limestone reservoirs. Acid is poured or pumped down the well to 
dissolve the limestone and increase fluid flow.” See NORMAN J. HYNE,
NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, DRILLING, AND 
PRODUCTION at p. 452 (2nd ed. 2001). “Well stimulation” is “an engineering 
method used to increase the permeability of a reservoir around the wellbore to 
increase production. It includes acidizing and hydraulic fracturing.” See NORMAN 
J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION,
DRILLING AND PRODUCTION at p. 546 (2nd ed. 2001). 
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and obtained such an order from the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court affirmed, stating:
It is our opinion that the trial judge, under the evidence, correctly 
held that the defendant had failed to fulfill its implied obligation 
and covenant to further develop the property by drilling new wells 
with the modern process which had proved so successful on other 
leased properties adjoining and in the vicinity of the property in 
question.150
A somewhat analogous fact pattern was presented by Waseco Chemical & 
Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp.151 Waseco concerned a 1934 lease 
that covered eighty acres in the Bellevue Field in Bossier Parish. The field 
contained a shallow sand—at about 350 to 500 feet below the surface—
that contained a heavy, viscous oil. That reservoir had little pressure and 
little tendency for gas drive or water drive. Operators tended to produce 
oil from the formation at low rates, from densely-spaced wells (about one 
per acre) that could be drilled inexpensively in about twelve hours. Bayou 
State acquired the lease at issue, the Scanland lease, in the early 1950s. At 
that time, about fifty wells had been drilled on the eighty-acre lease tract.
Most of the wells were producing, with total production being about forty-
six barrels per day. Over the next twenty-four years, Bayou State did not 
drill any more wells on the leased premises or make any capital 
expenditures, and by 1976, about nine wells on the property still were 
producing, at a cumulative rate of about six barrels per day.
Other operators in the area were doing somewhat better. In 1963, 
Getty had begun using fireflood152 operations in the Bellevue Field and 
had dramatically increased rates of production. Initially, Getty’s fireflood 
project was just a pilot project, but within a few years it was evident that 
                                                                                                        
150. See Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720 at 724.
151. Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 
305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
152. “Fireflooding” is a method for recovering high-viscosity oil that would 
be difficult or impossible to recover by other means. In this method, the operator 
ignites the oil in a portion of the formation where it is found. The heat from this 
“in-situ combustion” causes the oil near the fire to break down into lighter, less 
viscous compounds. The less viscous compounds will flow more easily and 
therefore can be recovered more easily. This process also creates coke. The coke 
burns, creating more heat. The “combustion front” advances, helping to cause a 
similar breakdown of the viscous oil in portions of the formation further from the 
initial point of combustion. The operator injects air into the formation to supply 
the oxygen needed to keep the fire alive. MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra
note 35, at 508.1 (definition of “in situ combustion”).
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the project was successful, and Getty began expanding its fireflood 
operations rapidly. Cities Service began extensive use of fireflood 
operations in the area, starting in 1971. Bayou State itself used a fireflood 
operation on a different lease tract in 1970, but did not perform such 
operations on the Scanland lease. Evidence showed that fireflooding could 
significantly increase total recovery. With the use of fireflooding, 
operators could recover about 60% of the heavy oil in place, compared to 
recovery of about 5% when they did not use fireflooding. Fireflooding also 
significantly increased the rate of production. Lessors could expect about 
$1200 per acre per month in royalties when fireflood operations were used, 
compared to about $3 per acre per month when fireflooding was not used.
The lessors brought suit against Bayou State, seeking lease cancellation.
The trial court granted an order of lease cancellation, citing Wadkins, and 
the Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed.153
Courts in other states have reached similar conclusions. In Rhoads 
Drilling Co. v. Allred, a Texas appellate court concluded that, after an oil 
well quit flowing, the operator was obligated to install a pump if doing so 
reasonably could be expected to yield a profit.154
In Utilities Production Corporation v. Carter Oil Co., the issue 
actually in dispute was somewhat different—whether the lessee had a right 
to use natural gas produced from the lease for repressuring operations.155
The lessor argued that the lessee did not because such operations were not 
widely known at the time the parties entered the lease. The court rejected 
that argument, stating that oil and gas methods continually evolve and that 
the parties must have anticipated that new techniques would be developed 
and used during the life of the lease. The court added, “In fact, the lessor 
would doubtless have just cause to complain if an inefficient operation of 
the leases resulted from the failure of the lessees to use improved methods 
which came in common use during the terms of the leases.”156
Courts in other states have suggested in dicta that implied covenants 
might require a lessee to use advanced recovery techniques. For example, 
in In re Shailer’s Estate, the owner of a life estate and the remainderman 
disputed the right to proceeds from secondary recovery operations.157 In 
deciding that issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in dicta, with 
apparent approval: “There is respectable authority to the effect that there 
is an implied covenant in oil and gas leases that a lessee should resort to a 
secondary recovery method shown to be practical and presumably 
                                                                                                        
153. 371 So. 2d at 313.
154. Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934).
155. Utilities Production Corp. v. Carter Oil Co., 72 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1934).
156. Id. at 659.
157. In re Shailer’s Estate, 266 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1954).
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profitable as a means of getting additional return from the lease.”158 An 
Illinois appellate court stated that, “It is an implied right and duty of a 
reasonably prudent operator under an oil and gas lease to adopt a system 
providing for the secondary recovery of oil.”159 Thus, to the extent that 
courts have addressed the issue, they have concluded that a lessee 
sometimes will have to use new technology in order to satisfy one of the 
traditional implied covenants.
Commentators have likewise concluded that the implied covenants 
require a lessee to utilize advances in technology to the extent that a 
reasonably prudent operator would do so.160 One classic authority on 
implied covenants stated that, “The obligation to adopt new and improved 
methods of development and operation as their practicability and 
superiority become obvious is manifest.”161 The authors of a more recent 
paper stated: 
That is, to determine whether a lessee is required to drill a well 
under the reasonable development covenant or the drainage 
covenant, the basic question to be answered is whether a similarly-
situated, reasonably prudent operator would drill the well. As 
technology changes, the prudent operator standard changes with 
technology. If it can be established that other operators use 3-D
seismic techniques, or use satellite imagery, or use horizontal 
drilling, there can be little doubt that a lessee, to meet the prudent 
operator standard, will be required to use the same technology to 
meet its obligation to develop the premises, to explore the 
premises, or to protect the premises.162
                                                                                                        
158. Id. at 616-17.
159. Bi-County Properties v. Wampler, 378 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1978); see also Reed v. Texas Co., 159 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ill. Ct. App. 1959).
160. Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of 
Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 689-90 (1994) (suggesting that the 
prudent operator standard can be used to determine whether the lessee is required 
to “use new processes developed in the industry); see also Gloria L. Scott, 
Development Obligations of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 13 ST. MARY’S L.J. 846, 865 
(1982) (“The implied obligation to maximize recovery, for example, may require 
the lessee to use modern production techniques.”).
161. Maurice H. Merrill, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL 
AND GAS LEASES, § 225 (1940).
162. Taylor Reid and John W. Morrison, Doing the Lateral Lambada: 
Negotiating the Technical and Legal Challenges of Horizontal Drilling, 43rd 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., Paper No. 16 (1997).
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There has been relatively little commentary regarding which implied 
covenant is at issue if an operator’s failure to use new technology causes
him to produce less oil or gas than a reasonably prudent operator would 
produce. One commentator suggested that secondary recovery and 
stimulation processes applied to existing wells might not be part of the 
duty to develop, but that doing such things could fit within “the implied 
covenant to manage and administer the lease, which includes a duty to use 
modern methods of production.”163 But another oil and gas scholar 
discussed the potential obligation to use new technology as potentially 
coming under the development obligation.164 Perhaps more important than 
the commentators’ possible disagreement regarding which implied 
covenant is at issue is their apparent agreement that a lessee who performs 
poorly because he fails to use new technology can be liable for breach of 
some type of implied covenant.165 It seems clear, then, that, if a lessee’s 
failure to use new technology results in his failure to develop, explore, 
protect, or market to the extent that a reasonably prudent operator would 
do so, the lessee should be liable for breach of an implied covenant. This 
seems true under any of the major theoretical justifications for implied 
covenants.
For example, consider the implied-intent justification. This theory 
provides that parties to leases do not specify a lessee’s duties in detail 
                                                                                                        
163. Laura H. Burney and Norman J. Hyne, Hydraulic Fracturing: 
Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing, 44TH ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., Paper 19 
(1998). A prominent treatise similarly discusses a lessee’s failure to use “modern 
production techniques” under a section of the treatise that examines an implied 
covenant to conduct operations with reasonable care and diligence. See MARTIN 
& KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 861.3.
164. Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil & Gas Leases – Past, Present 
& Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 648-9 (1994).
165. When the lessor’s complaint is that the lessee did not produce oil or gas 
from a proven formation as quickly as he should or that he did not obtain as large 
an ultimate recovery he should, the author of this paper suggests that the alleged 
breach relates to the implied covenant of reasonable development. The classic 
description of the implied covenant of reasonable development states that the 
covenant requires a lessee to drill as many wells as reasonably necessary to 
develop a proven formation. An alleged duty to use acidizing, fireflooding, or 
some other technology might not seem to fit within this description. But one could 
argue that the classic description refers to drilling as man wells as is reasonably 
necessary because the classic way to further develop the premises is to drill more 
wells. If a reasonably prudent operator would further develop a proven formation 
by using well stimulation, secondary recovery, or some other technology, there 
seems little reason why a duty to do that cannot be considered part of the covenant 
of reasonable development.
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because they lack sufficient information at the time of lease execution to 
specify exactly what the lessee should do, but the parties’ implied intent is 
that the operator will act as a reasonably prudent operator. Under this 
explanation, implied covenants are an application of the parties’ implied 
intent. Assuming that the parties implicitly expected a lessee to drill as 
many wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill for the purposes 
of developing proven formations, to explore unproven areas to the extent 
that a prudent operator would, to protect the leased premises against 
drainage to the same extent that a reasonably prudent operator would, and 
to market product as diligently as a prudent operator would, there seems 
no reason to believe that they would not also expect an operator to use new 
technology that a reasonably prudent operator would use.
Another explanation for implied covenants is that courts impose such 
covenants to promote fairness, driven in part by the fact that the nature of 
oil and gas leasing results in leases that do not have many explicit 
protections for lessors. This explanation leads to a similar conclusion 
regarding a lessee’s duty to use new technology. In the same way that the 
parties lack sufficient information at the time of contracting to specify how 
many wells an operator should drill, they also lack information to specify 
what techniques an operator should use. This is particularly true given that 
leases can last for decades, spanning time during which technology 
advances significantly. If a particular operator recovers less product than 
a reasonably prudent operator would recover because the particular 
operator fails to use new technology that reasonably prudent operators are 
using, that seems just as unfair to a lessor as when a particular operator 
recovers less product because he drills fewer wells than a reasonably 
prudent operator would drill.
Finally, commentators occasionally cite public policy as a reason for 
courts to impose implied covenants. If public policy favors production of 
oil and gas, and a particular operator produces less oil or gas than a 
reasonably prudent operator would produce, the public policy that favors 
production seems equally offended whether the shortfall in production is
a result of drilling fewer wells or failing to use new technology.
Thus, the logic behind implied covenants, as well as the existing 
jurisprudence and commentary, all suggest that a lessee can breach his 
implied obligations if his failure to use new technology causes his 
performance to be substandard relative to that of a reasonably prudent 
operator. Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that a lessee, as a practical 
matter, sometimes will have a duty to use new technology. An operator 
will not have an obligation to use technology as soon as it becomes 
available or is proven. Courts should be cautious in reaching a conclusion 
that a particular lessee has breached an implied covenant. Even if every 
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operator that exists was reasonably diligent, they would not all begin using 
new technology simultaneously. Some operator inevitably will be the first 
to implement new technology, and some operator inevitably will be the 
last. The mere fact that an operator has not yet started using technology 
that some other operators are using should not be a basis to find that the 
operator breached implied covenant duties. But when an operator fails to 
act as a reasonably prudent operator, it is not a valid defense that the 
operator is performing as well as can be expected for someone who uses 
outdated technology. 
The emergence of shale plays and the techniques used in them 
illustrate the importance of technological revolution. Shale plays did not 
become economically feasible until relatively recently, with advances in 
two technologies—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling—and those 
technologies continue to evolve. If an operator is maintaining a lease with 
production from a conventional formation, but is not using horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing to develop a shale formation found within 
the leased premises, the lessor could argue that the operator has breached 
an implied covenant of reasonable development or further exploration. At 
least one lessor has made such an argument in a dispute regarding 
development arising in the Fayetteville Shale area,166 and another made 
the argument in a case relating to the Haynesville Shale.167 Further, there 
is some case law in which courts have held that an operator’s failure to use 
other advanced production techniques constituted a breach of the duty of 
reasonable development.
The development of shale plays also raises the potential for such 
claims. Successful development of shale formations is expensive. Several 
of the shale formations are located in deep strata, and economic 
development often requires horizontal laterals that are a mile or more in 
length. For this reason, drilling is expensive. Further, hydraulic fracturing 
is necessary and fracturing operations add still more expense. Indeed, the 
expense of drilling and completing such wells may be beyond the 
capability of some companies. But some of those companies may have 
leases that are held by production—perhaps shallow oil or gas 
production—in the area where shale plays are located. This creates the 
potential for lessors to conclude that such a lessee’s failure to drill wells 
to develop the shale formation is a breach of the lessee’s duty of reasonable 
development. Or, perhaps the lessee has drilled and fractured some wells 
                                                                                                        
166. See Acre v. Spindletop Oil & Gas Co., 2011 WL 902186, at *1 (E.D. Ark.). 
167. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration and Production Co., 70 So. 3d 974 (La. 
App. 2d 2011).
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to the shale formation, but the lessor believes that the lessee has not drilled 
enough wells.
Such a claim was brought in Ferrara v. Questar Exploration and 
Production Co., a dispute that arose in an area where the Haynesville Shale 
is located.168 In that case, the lessor gave notice to the lessee and then
brought suit for an alleged breach of implied covenant duties not long after 
news of early success in the shale play first became public. The Louisiana 
Second Circuit held that the lessors failed to prove that a reasonably 
prudent operator would have responded that quickly and therefore failed 
to prove that the lessee had breached its implied covenant duties. A similar 
claim was made by a lessor who owned land in the area of Arkansas where 
the Fayetteville Shale is located.169 In the Arkansas case, the lessee’s 
motion for summary judgment was denied and the case continued.
A recent case from Ohio also noted the role that implied covenants 
might play in protecting lessors’ interests as technology changes.
Specifically, in Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co.,170 the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated: “We also note that the implied covenant of 
reasonable development is well suited to address the primary driver of the 
Landowners’ interest here, namely the emergence of new drilling 
technologies permitting production form deep strata that could not be 
obtained before.”171
F. Summary of Implied Covenants Primer
Because of the uncertainties inherent in oil and gas exploration, leases 
typically leave much to the discretion of the lessee. This prompts courts to 
enforce various implied covenants against lessees. The implied covenants 
most commonly recognized by courts and commentators include 
covenants to drill a test well, reasonably develop the leased premises, 
conduct further exploration, diligently market any product that is found in 
paying quantities, protect the leased premises against drainage, and 
reasonably restore the surface condition of the leased premises. But courts 
generally will not impose an implied covenant that is inconsistent with the 
express terms of a lease. Accordingly, lessees can attempt to limit the 
scope of their duties under implied covenants by use of lease clauses that 
expressly limit their duties.
In most states, a lessor must give his lessee notice and opportunity to 
cure an alleged breach of an implied covenant before bringing suit. If a 
                                                                                                        
168. Id. 
169. Acre v. Spindletop Oil & Gas Co., 2011 WL 902186, at *1 (E.D. Ark. 2011).
170. Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 95 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2018).
171. Id. at 309.
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lessor brings suit, seeking lease termination or a declaration that the lease 
already has terminated, the jurisprudence of several states provides that a 
lessee’s duties to drill additional wells is suspended while the suit is 
pending; this is sometimes called the repudiation doctrine. The existence 
of implied covenants, as well as their nature and scope, are issues of law.
The question of whether a lessee has breached an implied covenant 
generally is an issue of fact, and the lessor who brings an implied covenant 
claim generally will have the burden of proof.
II. POTENTIALLY EMERGING ISSUES
Changes in technology are raising new issues. For example, under 
certain fact patterns, lessors might choose to assert arguments that their 
lessees breached implied covenant duties by failing to utilize 3-D seismic 
or horizontal drilling or hydraulic fracturing. But arguably some of the 
most interesting emerging issues may relate to the implied covenant to 
protect against drainage and express offset well covenants.
A. Duty to Protect Against Drainage by Fractures that Cross Property 
Lines
Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy Trust is best known for its 
decision regarding a subsurface trespass claim.172 In this case, the plaintiffs 
brought a claim for subsurface trespass, alleging that the defendant had 
committed a subsurface trespass by conducting a hydraulic fracturing 
operation on neighboring land in such a manner that fractures crossed into 
the subsurface of the area where the plaintiffs owned mineral rights (they 
had granted a lease covering those rights). The only harm alleged by the 
plaintiffs was the drainage of hydrocarbons. The court held that, under 
these circumstances, the rule of capture precluded recovery for the 
drainage of hydrocarbons and that the plaintiffs did not have an actionable 
trespass. But Garza also recognized that a lessee might have a duty under 
an implied covenant to protect its lessor against such drainage.
B. Duty to Protect Against Drainage in Vertical Direction
Severances of interests by depth seem to be becoming more common.
This may lead to drainage disputes between working interest owners when 
the plane that divides the two lessees’ interests bisects a productive 
formation (and possibly even if the plane does not bisect a productive 
                                                                                                        
172. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 
2008).
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formation if the plane is near enough to a productive formation). In most 
cases, the same lessor will own both the shallow and the deep rights. But 
if different lessors own deep and shallow rights, or if the same lessor owns 
mineral rights as to all depths, but the two leases provide for substantially 
different royalty amounts, a lessor may assert a drainage dispute about 
drainage in the vertical direction, as opposed to the more typical drainage 
complaint about drainage in the horizontal direction. Further, in some 
jurisdictions, it may not be clear how the regulator will apply pooling and 
spacing rules when competing wells are separated vertically, rather than 
horizontally. 
C. What is an Offset Well, and is There Really Drainage?
In Adams v. Murphy Exploration and Production Co.-USA, the lessors 
asserted that the lessee breached an express offset well covenant.173 The 
covenant provided that:
[I]n the event a well is completed as a producer of oil and/or gas 
on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased premises, and within 
467 feet of the premises covered by this lease, that Lessee herein 
is hereby obligated to, within 120 days after the completion date 
of the well or wells on the adjacent acreage, as follows:
(1) to commence drilling operations on the leased acreage and 
thereafter continue the drilling of such off-set well or wells with 
due diligence to a depth adequate to test the same formation from 
which the well or wells are producing from on the adjacent 
acreage; or
(2) pay the Lessor royalties as provided for in this lease as if an 
equivalent amount of production of oil and/or gas were being 
obtained from the off-set location on these leased premises as that 
which is being produced from the adjacent well or wells; or
(3) release an amount of acreage sufficient to constitute a spacing 
unit equivalent in size to the spacing unit that would be allocated 
under this lease to such well or wells on the adjacent lands, as to 
the zones or strata producing in such adjacent well.174
An operator on the neighboring tract drilled a horizontal well that triggered
application of this covenant. In response, Murphy Exploration drilled a 
horizontal well on the leased premises. The horizontal well on the leased 
                                                                                                        
173. Adams v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.-USA, 497 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. 
App. 4th Dist. 2016).
174. Id. at 512. 
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premises was spaced about 2,100 feet from the horizontal well that 
triggered the offset well covenant. The lessor brought suit in state court in 
Texas, asserting that the well that Murphy drilled did not qualify as an 
offset well. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Murphy Exploration, dismissing the lessor’s claim. The lessor appealed.
The San Antonio appellate court concluded that the commonly 
understood meaning of “offset well” is a well that is used to protect against 
drainage. After considering the summary judgment evidence, the court 
held that Murphy Exploration “failed to prove as a matter of law” that the 
well drilled on the leased premises was protecting the premises from 
drainage by the well on the neighboring tract.175 For this reason, the 
appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Murphy 
Exploration.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and 
reinstated the trial court’s judgment.176 The Court noted that the offset well 
clause did not specify how close to the lease lines the offset well needed 
to be drilled.177 The Court acknowledged that an offset well often has been 
viewed as a well that protects against drainage, but in the context of a low-
permeability formation, hydrocarbons do not migrate “in the same 
fashion” as in a conventional reservoir.178 This suggests that neither the 
existence vel non of drainage nor the effectiveness of a well in protecting 
against drainage depends on proximity of either well to lease lines. The 
Texas Supreme Court ultimately viewed the offset well clause as simply 
triggering an obligation that the lessee drill a well in the specified 
formation, now within any given distance from the lease lines.
The lessee eventually prevailed, but this case was a close call. Six 
judges (the trial court judge and five justice of the Texas Supreme Court) 
viewed the offset well clause as the lessee did, while seven judges (three 
appellate court judges and four justices of the Texas Supreme Court) 
viewed the clause as the lessor did. This illustrates that parties should 
carefully consider the language of any express offset well covenants. For 
example, do the parties intend that the lessee can satisfy the clause by 
drilling any well to the same formation as the neighboring well that 
triggered the offset well clause, or must the offset well be close enough to 
the lease lines to protect against drainage? Does it matter whether the 
neighboring well is drilled into a conventional formation or a low-
permeability formation? If hydraulic fracturing is being used in an area, 
                                                                                                        
175. Id. at 517.
176. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.–USA v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105, 
114 (Tex. 2018). 
177. Id. at 111.
178. Id. at 112-13.
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what distance should the parties choose as the distance within which a well 
on neighboring property will trigger an offset well covenant? Does it 
matter if the neighboring well is not likely to drain the leased premises 
because fractures are not likely to extend to the leased premises?
If the appellate court’s conclusion that a well must protect against 
drainage in order to qualify as an “offset well” had prevailed—a result that 
might be the outcome in some other state--would the lessor for lessees be 
that they should insist that express offset well covenants be drafted to 
avoid using the term “offset well,” and instead merely require that the
lessee drill a well within a specified distance of the lease line? If parties 
decide to retain the phrasing that requires the lessee to drill an “offset 
well,” the lessee also might benefit by language stating that this obligation 
can be satisfied by drilling a well within a specified distance of the lease 
line. Otherwise, the lessee would have to litigate whether its new well is 
“close enough” to the lease boundary to protect against drainage and 
qualify as an offset well.179
III. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
There are various considerations that parties should keep in mind with 
respect to implied covenants when drafting or negotiating leases. These 
considerations include clauses for the benefit of either the lessee or lessor.
This Article identifies more clauses that could be used to benefit lessees 
than lessors. In part, this is because implied covenants burden lessees, not 
lessors. And, in part, this is because most of the provisions that lessors 
might use are clauses that impose express covenants or which convert 
certain types of performance by a lessee from being covenants to being 
limitations or conditions.
A. Clauses to Benefit Lessee
There are several types of clauses relating to implied covenants that a 
lessee can utilize to protect itself. These include clauses that give the lessee 
an opportunity to correct any alleged breach, clauses that limit the 
remedies available in the case of breach, and clauses that lessen the 
lessee’s implied contractual obligation by eliminating all (or some) 
implied covenants or by restricting the obligation due under such 
covenants. Some types of clauses that would benefit a lessee are discussed 
below.
                                                                                                        
179. Presumably, a well drilled close to the lease line would protect against 
drainage—in the sense of protecting against the possibility of drainage—even if 
no drainage were occurring.
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1. Notice and Cure Clause
Lessees should consider including in their leases a clause that requires 
a lessor to give the lessee written notice of any alleged breach of an implied 
covenant, as well as a reasonable opportunity to cure the breach, before 
the lessor files suit based on the alleged breach. Someone could ask 
whether including a contractual notice-and-cure clause in a lease will 
really matter. After all, at least one jurisdiction generally makes notice and 
an opportunity to cure a prerequisite to any implied covenant claim,180 and,
in many other states, jurisprudence provides that the equitable remedy of 
lease cancellation is unavailable if a lessor fails to give the lessee notice 
and a reasonable opportunity-to-cure before bringing suit.181
Nevertheless, a contractual notice-and-cure clause can provide certain 
benefits to the lessee. First, an occasional court may not follow the 
generally accepted jurisprudential rule that makes notice and an 
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a suit for lease termination even when 
a lease does not contain a notice-and-cure clause. But such a court may 
enforce a contractual agreement for notice and an opportunity to cure.
Because lease termination can be a harsh remedy, the lessee may greatly 
benefit from having notice of any alleged breach and an opportunity to 
cure it.
Second, in many states, jurisprudence does not make notice and an 
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a lessor’s suit for damages.182 In some 
circumstances, a lessee may be able to cure an alleged breach and preclude 
an action for damages altogether, provided that the lessee is given notice 
of the breach and time to make a cure. If the lessee does so, this could save 
legal costs by avoiding litigation. It also could help prevent the lessee from 
being on the losing end of a money judgment, and it might help preserve 
some degree of a working relationship between the lessor and lessee. Even 
if those benefits cannot be obtained, the requirement of notice and 
opportunity to cure may provide a modest benefit by delaying litigation.
If parties agree to include a notice-and-cure clause in their lease, they 
will need to decide whether notice and an opportunity to cure will be a 
prerequisite to: any action by the lessor; any action for breach of 
covenants—whether implied or express; any action based on implied 
covenants; or any action seeking lease termination. In addition, they will 
need to decide the length of the cure period. Will the lessee be allowed a 
                                                                                                        
180. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:136.
181. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.
182. See id.
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“reasonable” time, a specifically-stated number of days, or the greater of 
either a reasonable time or a specified number of days?
In addition, they will need to decide whether the lessee must 
commence a cure or complete a cure. Given that planning, drilling, and 
completing a well can be a lengthy process, and that curing an alleged 
breach often will involve these tasks, the lessee should bargain for the 
clause to be drafted so that it merely requires the commencement of a cure, 
rather than the completion of a cure. If the clause merely requires 
commencement of the cure, the lessor should ask for the clause to require 
that, once commenced, the process of curing the alleged breach must be 
prosecuted to completion with reasonable diligence. As an alternative to 
merely requiring that a cure be commenced with the cure period, a lessee 
could protect itself by bargaining for a lengthy cure period, but a lessor 
probably will want a reasonably short period for commencement of a cure.
The language of a notice and cure clause will depend in part on the 
parties’ choices regarding these issues. A lease from North Dakota 
contained a clause that allowed the lessee a specified number of days to 
commence a cure. The clause stated:
In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has failed to comply with 
any obligation hereunder, express or implied, Lessor shall notify 
Lessee in writing specifying in what respects Lessor claims Lessee 
has breached this lease. The service of such notice and the lapse 
of sixty days without Lessee’s meeting or commencing to meet 
the alleged breaches shall be a condition precedent to any action 
by Lessor for any cause. If within sixty days after receipt of such 
notice Lessee shall meet or commence to meet the breaches 
alleged by Lessor, Lessee shall not be deemed in default 
hereunder. The breach by Lessee of any obligation hereunder shall
not work a forfeiture or termination, in whole or in part, of this 
lease.183
A lease at issue in a case from Tennessee contained a clause that appears 
to require the lessor to give the lessee a specified number of days to 
complete a cure, though the specified cure period seems too short to be of 
much use to the lessee unless the lessor alleges a breach that is very simple 
to cure. The clause states: 
Lessors shall make no claim of default against Lessees or their 
assigns until Lessors, or their assigns, first notify the Lessees 
                                                                                                        
183. Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. P’shp, 553 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1996). For 
additional examples, see MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.1.
448 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
herein of such claim and unless such default is not cured within 
10 days after notice. Notice of default is effective when delivered 
or placed in the U.S. Mail, certified, addressed to the Lessees 
named herein at.184
If the parties preferred to specify that the lessee would have a reasonable 
time to cure, they could substitute “a reasonable time” in place of the 
reference to a specific number of days in the examples above. An 
alternative that would be even better for the lessee would be to substitute 
something like “the greater of a reasonable time or sixty days” (or some 
larger number of days) in place of “sixty days” in the first example quoted 
above.
If a lessee is concerned that it is difficult to predict how long it will 
take to complete a cure of a breach, he might seek to add language such 
as, “Lessee shall not, however, be deemed to be in default while work is 
in progress in good faith which when completed will constitute 
compliance with such condition or covenant.”185
2. Judicial Ascertainment Clause
Lessees should consider adding a judicial ascertainment clause to their 
oil and gas leases, using such a clause as a supplement to a clause requiring 
that the lessor give the lessee notice and an opportunity to cure before 
filing suit for an alleged breach of implied covenants. A judicial 
ascertainment clause seeks to address a dilemma that lessees sometimes 
face—a dilemma that the notice-and-cure clause, to which the judicial 
ascertainment clause is often compared, cannot resolve. 
Suppose, for example, that a lessor gives written notice to the lessee, 
asserting that the lessee had breached the implied covenant of reasonable 
development and demanding that the lessee drill an additional well within 
a reasonable time. The lessee believes in good faith that the proposed well 
is unnecessary and that it might even be counterproductive. Further, 
drilling the well would be very expensive. But a contrary reading of the 
geologic evidence is plausible. If the lessee drills, it will spend a large 
amount of money on a well that might be unprofitable and even 
counterproductive. If the lessee refuses to drill the proposed well, the 
lessor might bring suit. If a jury finds that the lessor’s expert is sufficiently 
convincing, the lessor might prevail, and a possible remedy could be lease 
                                                                                                        
184. Lone Star Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Howard, No. E2009-00428-COA-R3-CV, 
2010 WL 520934, at *2, n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2010).
185. This clause is quoted in a prominent treatise. See MARTIN & KRAMER,
supra note 132, at § 681.1.
2019] IMPLIED COVENANTS AND THE DRAFTING OF OIL AND GAS LEASES 449
termination. The lessee would be willing to spend the money to drill if it 
had to do so in order to save the lease, but the lessee would like its “day in 
court” to contest the need for the proposed well.
This is a type of situation in which a judicial ascertainment clause can 
help a lessee. Such a clause provides that the lease will not be terminated 
on account of a breach of the implied covenants until there is a judicial 
determination that there has been a breach and the lessee fails to drill after 
having been given a reasonable amount of time to do so. A key question 
is whether judicial ascertainment clauses are enforceable. In some 
jurisdictions, courts have indicated that such clauses are enforceable.
Examples include the Louisiana Supreme Court186 and a Colorado 
appellate court.187 In other jurisdictions, courts have indicated that judicial 
ascertainment clauses are not enforceable. Examples include the West 
Virginia Supreme Court,188 an Ohio appellate court,189 and a Texas 
appellate court.190
The courts that have held that judicial ascertainment clauses are not 
enforceable have expressed three concerns. First, judicial ascertainment 
clauses would result in piecemeal litigation that “would require at least 
two trials and two final judgments.”191 Second, some of the courts rejecting 
judicial ascertainment clauses have concluded that the lessee often has 
greater resources than the lessor, and that a lessee might take advantage of 
a judicial ascertainment clause to extract concessions from the lessor.192
And finally, certain courts have said that, in a jurisdiction that recognizes 
that leases can terminate by abandonment, a judicial ascertainment clause 
should not affect termination by abandonment.193
                                                                                                        
186. See Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135 (La. 1956). See also B.A. Kelly 
Land Co. v Questar Expl. and Prod. Co., 106 So. 3d 181, 192 (La. App. 2d 2012) 
(judicial ascertainment clause was enforceable).
187. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 374 (Colo. App. 1984).
188. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 262 (W. Va. 2001) (under 
West Virginia law, judicial ascertainment clause in oil and gas lease is void as 
against public policy).
189. Conny Farms, Ltd. v. Ball Res., Inc., No. 09 CO 36, 2011 WL 5053625, 
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2011) (under Ohio law, judicial ascertainment clause 
is against public policy and is void).
190. Frick-Reid Supply Corp. v. Meers, 52 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. App. 1932).
191. A Texas appellate court stated this, Frick-Reid, 52 S.W.2d at 118 and the 
West Virginia Supreme Court quoted Frick-Reid on this point. Wellman, 557 
S.E.2d at 259-60. The Ohio appellate court cited both Frick-Reid and Wellman.
See Conny Farms, 2011 WL 5053625.
192. See, e.g., Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 260.
193. Id.
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But these concerns seem misplaced. The first concern is the concern 
that a judicial ascertainment clause would result in piecemeal litigation, 
requiring “two trials,” but application of a judicial ascertainment clause 
would not require two full trials. If the lessee prevailed in the “first” trial, 
that would be the end of the litigation. If the lessor prevailed, the court 
would find liability and enter an order that the lease would terminate if the 
lessee does not drill an additional well within a time specified in the order.
If the lessee timely drills the required well, the lease will continue and 
there is no need for a second trial. If the lessee fails to do that, there will 
be no need for a second trial. Only if it is unclear whether the lessee has 
complied will there be a need for another hearing, and, in such a case, the 
only issue to resolve would be a narrow one—whether the lessee timely 
drilled the well required in the original order. There would be no need to 
re-litigate whether a prudent lessee would drill the well because that issue 
was decided in the first trial.
Further, there is another strong argument as to why the concern about 
piecemeal litigation is misplaced. As noted in the Section of this Article 
dealing with remedies for the breach of an implied covenant, many 
jurisdictions have held that conditional termination is a permissible 
remedy.194 That is, a court that finds that a lessee has breached an implied 
covenant may enter an order stating that the lease will terminate (in whole 
or part) unless the lessee drills a sell by a specified date. Indeed, some 
courts have stated that, although outright termination is also a permissible 
remedy, conditional termination is favored over outright termination.
The widespread acceptance of conditional terminations is important 
because a judicial ascertainment clause is essentially a clause stating that, 
if a court is going to order termination as a remedy, the order should 
provide for conditional termination, not outright termination.195 Thus, if 
use of conditional termination does not create an undue risk of piecemeal 
litigation, the enforcement of a judicial ascertainment clause should not 
create undue risk of piecemeal litigation because all the clause does is 
mandate that any termination will be a conditional termination. This is 
notable because, although West Virginia’s Supreme Court has stated that 
                                                                                                        
194. See supra Section I(D)(5).
195. A prominent commentator noted the seeming incongruity between 
concerns about piecemeal litigation and the general acceptance of conditional 
termination. See Maurice H. Merrill, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS 
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES, § 201 (1940) (referring to the “alternative 
decree”). Further, in Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 373-4 (Colo. App. 
1984), the court concluded that the lack of an adequate remedy at law, combined 
with the existence of a judicial ascertainment clause a lease, justified the trial 
court’s award of a conditional decree of cancellation. 
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judicial ascertainment clauses are void (in part because of the danger of 
piecemeal litigation), that court has accepted the use of conditional 
termination.196 And, although a Texas appellate court concluded that a 
judicial ascertainment clause is void (in part because of the danger of 
piecemeal litigation), the Texas Supreme Court has expressed approval for 
the use of conditional termination.197
As for the concern that lessees often have more resources than lessors 
and that they might abuse a judicial ascertainment clause, there are several 
responses. Of course, though lessees often have more resources than 
lessors, this is not always the case. Moreover, if the covenant that allegedly 
has been breached is a covenant to develop or explore, the lessor will be 
receiving royalties (those covenants do not apply until production has been 
established) and any delay in additional development or exploration will 
not cause a permanent loss. Instead, it will simply mean a delay in the 
lessor receiving an even higher instream of royalty income. Further, it
seems unlikely that a lessee will typically be in a position to coerce 
concessions from a lessor merely by delaying the commencement of 
drilling or other activities that would increase the lessor’s stream of 
royalties. Of course, if the implied covenant to protect against drainage is 
at issue, a delay in performance could result in a permanent loss, but a 
lessor can pursue a money damages award for drainage. Judicial 
ascertainment clauses typically apply only to actions for lease termination, 
not to claims for money damages.
Nevertheless, to the extent that a court is worried about the potential 
abuse of judicial ascertainment clauses, the court could follow the lead of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which stated that judicial ascertainment 
clauses are enforceable, provided that there is a bona fide dispute.198 That 
is, a lessee cannot simply refuse to perform when it has no valid defense, 
then invoke a judicial ascertainment clause to escape consequences. Also,
it is worth noting that there have not been widespread reports of abuse of 
judicial ascertainment clauses in the jurisdictions where these clauses are 
enforceable.
The third and final argument against the enforceability of judicial 
ascertainment clauses is that it would be unreasonable to enforce such a 
clause when a lease has been abandoned. But for a couple of reasons this 
                                                                                                        
196. See Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 173 S.E. 573 (W. Va. 1934); Adkins 
v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932). 
197. W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 32 (Tex. 1929) 
(referring to “alternative decree”). See also Slaughter v. Cities Service Oil Co., 
660 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App. 1983); Wes-Tex Land Co. v. Simmons, 566 S.W.2d 
719 (Tex. App. 1978).
198. Melancon v. Texas, 89 So. 2d 135, 146 (La. 1956). 
452 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
argument cannot plausibly support a general rule against the enforcement 
of judicial ascertainment clauses. For one thing, not all states recognize 
that leases can be lost by abandonment. More important, even in states that 
take the view that leases are subject to abandonment, this final concern 
need not stand in the way of enforcing judicial ascertainment clauses in 
circumstances that do not involve an abandoned lease. In other words, the 
fact that a judicial ascertainment clause would not apply if a lease has been 
abandoned should not preclude application of a judicial ascertainment 
clause when a lease has not been abandoned and the lessor merely alleges 
a breach of an implied covenant.
In short, the main arguments against enforcement of judicial 
ascertainment clauses seem flawed. Further, there are policy reasons that 
weigh in support of the enforceability of such clauses. One such policy 
reason is the public policy favoring freedom of contract. Second, there is 
widespread recognition that lease termination can be a harsh remedy. An 
order of conditional termination, pursuant to a judicial ascertainment 
clause, allows the lessee to avoid the harsh remedy of outright termination.
Third, use of conditional termination can even benefit the lessor.
Suppose, for example, that a court concludes that the lessee has breached 
an implied covenant, and the court enters an order that the lease will 
terminate unless the lessee drills a well by a certain time. If the lessee 
performs in response to a court’s decision, the lessor will receive the 
benefit of that performance.199 Indeed, in such a case, the lessor will 
probably receive the benefit of performance (the drilling of the well) 
sooner than if the court had granted an order cancelling the lease outright 
and the lessor had been put in the position of finding a new lessee or 
turning to a top lessee. The main downside is that, in the event that the 
lessee does not perform, the ultimate lease termination will be delayed by 
the amount of time that the lessee was given to perform, but that delay 
likely will be short in relation to the time that the litigation will take. Such 
a potential delay would seem to be outweighed by the benefits of enforcing 
the judicial ascertainment clause to which the parties agreed.
Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, courts hold that judicial 
ascertainment clauses are unenforceable. In such jurisdictions, rather than 
drafting leases to include a judicial ascertainment clause, lessees should 
consider drafting clauses in which the parties agree that any order granting 
termination as a remedy should be an order of conditional termination, 
rather than outright termination (see the next Section of this Article, 
                                                                                                        
199. Of course, damages may also have to be awarded in order to give a 
complete remedy in the event that the particular implied covenant that has been 
breached is the implied covenant to protect against drainage.
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Section III(A)(3) below). If, however, a prospective lessee negotiates to 
include a judicial ascertainment clause in a lease, a question may arise as 
to the specific language that would be used. The following are examples 
of judicial ascertainment clauses.
Example from Louisiana
After production of oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral has been 
secured from the land covered hereby or land pooled therewith, 
this lease shall not be subject to forfeiture or loss, either in whole 
or in part, for failure to conduct operations in compliance with this 
contract except after judicial ascertainment that Lessee has failed 
to conduct such operations and has been given a reasonable 
opportunity after such judicial ascertainment to prevent such loss 
or forfeiture by complying with and discharging its obligations as 
to which Lessee has been judicially determined to be default.200
Example from Montana
This lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for breach of 
implied covenant until it shall have been finally judicially 
determined that such breach exists and lessees shall have failed 
within a reasonable time of such final determination, to remedy 
such breach.201
Readers should note that the typical judicial ascertainment clause limits 
the circumstances in which forfeiture of a lease is a permissible remedy 
for breach of a covenant; such clauses typically have no application to 
limitations that provide for automatic termination of the lease or to 
conditions that give the lessor the right to terminate it.202 Nevertheless, a 
judicial ascertainment clause could be drafted so that it applies to 
limitations and conditions, effectively modifying them so that they do not 
provide for termination unless the lessee fails to correct them after a 
judicial ascertainment of facts that otherwise would terminate the lease.
Examples of judicial ascertainment clauses that are drafted to apply to 
                                                                                                        
200. B.A. Kelly Land Co., L.L.C. v. Questar Exploration and Production Co., 
106 So. 3d 181, 184-5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 112 So. 3d 223 (La. 
2013) (judicial ascertainment clause was enforceable).
201. Eddington v. Creek Oil Co., 690 P.2d 970, 974 (Mont. 1984).
202. King v. Estate of Gilbreath, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1177 (D. N. Mex. 
2016); Tisdale v. Walla, 1994 WL 738744 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist.); Babb v. 
Clemenson, 687 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 1996); Eddington v. Creek Oil Co., 
690 P.2d 970, 974 (Mont. 1984).
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limitations and conditions, not just breaches of covenants, are shown 
below.
Example from Colorado
It is agreed that this lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for 
failure to perform in whole or in part any of its implied covenants, 
conditions, or stipulations until it shall have first been finally 
judicially determined that such failure exists, and after such final 
determination, lessee is given a reasonable time therefrom to 
comply with any such covenants, conditions, or stipulations.203
Example from Ohio
It is agreed that this lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for 
failure to perform, in whole or in part, any of its covenants, 
conditions or stipulations, until it shall have been first finally 
judicially determined that such failure exists, and after such final 
determination, lessee is given a reasonable time therefrom to 
comply with any such covenants, conditions or stipulations.204
Example from West Virginia
This lease shall never be forfeited or terminated for failure of 
Lessee to perform in whole or in part any of its express or implied 
covenants, conditions or obligations until it shall have been first 
finally judicially determined that such failure exists, and Lessee 
shall have been given a reasonable time after such final 
determination within which to comply with any such covenants, 
conditions or obligations.205
3. Clause Restricting Termination Remedy to Conditional 
Termination
Prospective lessees should consider including in their leases a clause 
in which the parties agree that, if the court decides to grant lease 
termination as a remedy, the order granting such relief will be an order of 
conditional termination, rather than an order of outright termination. Such 
                                                                                                        
203. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 371 (Colo. App. 1984).
204. Conny Farms, Ltd., 2011 WL 5053625, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.).
205. Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 258 (W. Va. 2001). 
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that judicial ascertainment clauses are 
unenforceable, so this clause was not enforced, but the court’s reasoning was not 
based on the particular wording of the clause.
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a clause could be called a “conditional termination” clause. The 
enforcement of such a clause would provide the same benefits as would 
be provided by the enforcement of a judicial ascertainment clause. Thus, 
a conditional termination clause might be particularly useful in states 
where courts refuse to enforce judicial ascertainment clauses.
It is possible that a jurisdiction that bars enforcement of judicial 
ascertainment clauses might choose to bar enforcement of a conditional 
termination clause. On the other hand, some of the same jurisdictions that 
bar enforcement of judicial ascertainment clauses allow the use of 
conditional termination. Further, courts often will follow the terms of a 
retained acreage clause, and a conditional termination clause is somewhat 
similar to a retained acreage clause. A retained acreage clause purports to 
preclude complete termination while allowing partial termination. A
conditional termination clause likewise purports to preclude outright 
termination, while allowing conditional termination.
In order to drive home the analogy between the conditional 
termination clause and a retained acreage clauses, the parties should 
consider combining the two clauses into a single section of the lease, and 
drafting the language of the conditional termination clause to track the 
language of the retained acreage clause. Such a combined clause might 
read as follows: 
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause, 
the cancellation or termination shall be a partial cancellation or 
termination, meaning that lessee shall have the right to retain 
under the terms hereof, ____ acres of land around each oil or gas 
well producing, being working on, or drilling hereunder (as long 
as such operations are continued in good faith) such tract to be 
designated by lessee in as near a square form as practicable.
Further, the parties agree that, if any cancellation or termination 
of this lease is granted as a remedy for any breach of an implied 
or express covenant to drill a development, exploratory, or offset 
well, the cancellation or termination shall be a conditional 
cancellation or termination, meaning that the remedy shall be an 
order (sometimes called an “alternative decree”) that the lessee 
must drill such a well within a reasonable time or the lease will be 
cancelled or terminate automatically, except as to ____ acres of 
land around each oil or gas well producing, being working on, or 
drilling hereunder.206
                                                                                                        
206. The clause proposed above does not come from an actual lease. The 
retained acreage portion of the clause is a modified version of a retained acreage 
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4. Clause Restricting Termination Remedy to Partial Termination
A prospective lessee should consider use of a retained acreage clause 
in order to limit a lessor’s remedy for breach of implied covenants to 
partial termination.
As noted in the Section of this Article that discusses remedies, if a 
court finds that a lessee has breached implied covenants and that the proper 
remedy is lease termination, the court sometimes will decide even in the 
absence of a retained acreage clause to order partial termination, rather 
than complete termination. Such an order might terminate the lease as to 
areas that the lessee had not prudently developed or explored, or where the 
lessee had not protected against drainage, while allowing the lessee to 
retain its rights as to the other portions of the lease. As a slight variation 
on this concept, an order might terminate the lease except for the wellbore 
of any productive wells and perhaps a modest amount of acreage around 
each. But in other cases, a court might order complete lease termination, 
even if the lessee had one or more productive wells. Such an order could 
be very costly. A retained acreage clause is a provision by which the 
parties agree that any time lease termination is ordered as a remedy, the 
termination will be partial termination, not complete termination.
If the parties agree to such a clause, the clause should address certain 
issues such as whether the clause applies to any lease terminations or only 
terminations that are based on a certain cause. Another issue is the amount 
of acreage that the lessee will retain. Some clauses allow the lessee to 
retain a specified number of acres, while other clauses may vary the size 
of the retained area depending on the depth of the well, whether the well 
is an oil well or a gas well, or the spacing and pooling rules and orders of 
the state’s oil and gas regulator. Another issue is whether the lessee will 
retain rights as to all depths within the retained acreage, or only certain 
depths. Another issue to consider is the shape of the retained area.
Finally, the lessee will want to ensure that a clause is not written too 
narrowly. The lessee will want to draft the clause to retain acreage around 
wells that are being drilled or reworked, in addition to any wells that are 
producing at the time of the order of termination. Further, a lessee should 
consider including in the clause provisions that will preserve certain 
surface rights even as to the areas where the lease is terminated. For 
example, the lessee will want the right to continue using any pipelines, 
                                                                                                        
clause quoted elsewhere in this Article. See supra note 202 and accompanying 
text. The conditional termination portion was drafted by the author of this Article. 
Other drafters may be able to improve upon it.
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support facilities, or access roads, even if those are located on lands where 
the lessee’s working interest is terminated.207
An example of a retained acreage clause that allowed the lessee to 
keep a specified number of acres around each well stated:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause, 
lessee shall have the right to retain under the terms hereof, twenty 
(20) acres of land around each oil or gas well producing, being 
working on, or drilling hereunder (as long as such operations are 
continued in good faith) such tract to be designated by lessee in as 
near a square form as practicable.208
A lease involved in another case contained a clause stating that the lessee 
would be entitled to retain the greater of forty acres or the amount of 
acreage allotted to the well under a spacing order or rule of the state’s oil 
and gas regulator. This clause stated:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause, 
Lessee shall have the right to retain under the terms hereof forty 
acres of land around each well producing, being worked on, or 
drilling hereunder, unless there be in force in said area at such time 
a spacing order or regulation of the Conservation Commissioner 
or other governmental agency allocating more than forty acres to 
each well, in which case Lessee shall have the right to retain 
around each such well the number of acres allocated to each well 
under such order or regulation. The tract so retained shall be 
designated by Lessee in as near a square form as practicable.209
A clause that provides for the lessee retaining producing wells (and wells 
being drilled), but which does not expressly provide for the retention of 
acreage around the wells, provided:
Notwithstanding any forfeiture of this lease, the Lessee shall have 
the right to retain any and all wells being drilled, or producing or 
capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, at the time of 
                                                                                                        
207. “Working interest” has been defined as the “operating interest under an 
oil and gas lease.” MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 1156..
208. Francis v. Pritchett, 278 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955, error ref’d). 
The clause quoted above, as well as some of the other clauses quoted above and 
yet other clauses are cited in a prominent treatise. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra
note 132, at § 681.1.
209. Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135 (La. 1956).
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such forfeiture.210
A prominent treatise quotes clauses from two California leases that sought 
to preserve certain surface rights that it might need in the area where its 
lease rights otherwise were terminated. One of the leases contained a 
clause stating:
A termination of this lease as to a part only of the leased land or 
as to a part only of Lessee’s rights shall not affect such rights of 
way and easements as may be necessary in Lessee’s operations on 
the part of the leased land as to which no such termination shall 
have occurred.211
The clause in the other California lease stated: 
Notwithstanding any partial termination of this lease, whether by 
surrender, forfeiture, or otherwise, Lessee shall have such rights-
of-way over, upon, and across the land with respect to which this 
lease has terminated as are necessary or convenient for Lessee’s 
operations hereunder on the leased land retained by it.212
5. Clause to Preclude Termination as a Remedy
In some leases, parties have agreed to a clause that purports to 
preclude termination as a remedy. An example of such a clause states:
[N]o part of this lease shall be forfeited or terminated by reason of 
the breach of any implied condition or covenants thereof.213
6. Clause Suspending Implied Covenant Duties During Challenge to 
Lease
A prospective lessee should bargain for its oil and gas lease to include 
a clause that suspends the lessee’s implied covenant obligations during any 
period when the lessor or some other person challenges a lease. Such a 
challenge could be a lawsuit or arbitration in which the lessee seeks a 
ruling that terminates the lease as a remedy for the lessee’s alleged breach 
of some obligation. Alternatively, the challenge may involve an assertion 
                                                                                                        
210. Danker v. Lee, 137 Cal. App. 2d 797, 291 P.2d 73, 5 O.&G.R. 313 (1955).
211. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 681.3.
212. Id.
213. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Christian, 83 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1935, error ref’d).
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by the lessor or some other person that the lease is unenforceable because 
it allegedly has terminated, was procured by fraud, or was granted by 
someone who lacked title to the minerals covered by the lease. Absent a 
lease clause that suspends the lessee’s implied covenant obligations during 
such a challenge, the lessee may face an unpleasant choice.
One choice is that the lessee can spend money on drilling or other 
development activities, even though that investment may be lost if the 
lessor prevails on its challenge to the lease. Given that drilling and other 
development activities can be costly, this choice is risky. Indeed, if the 
lessor or other person challenging the lease asserts that the lease is not 
enforceable (as opposed to seeking termination of an enforceable lease as 
a remedy), a lessee who drills an additional well faces risks beyond the 
possibility of losings its investment. If a putative lessee drills a dry hole at 
a time that the lessee lacked any rights under the lease, the lessee may have 
trespass liability. Such liability may require the company to pay money 
damages to compensate the owner of the mineral rights for any loss of 
leasing opportunity or diminution in value of the minerals that might be 
caused by news of the dry hole.214 Given these risks, lessees often conclude 
that the most prudent course is to refrain from further development until 
the challenge to the lease is resolved.
But if the lessee chooses to refrain from additional investment until a 
challenge is resolved, that choice could raise certain questions. For 
example, could the lessee’s lack of further drilling while the lease was 
being challenged constitute a breach of one of the implied covenants? If
the original challenge to the lease is found to be valid, this question may 
be irrelevant because the success of the original challenge may mean that 
the lease is unenforceable anyway. But if a court rejects the original 
challenge, holding that it lacked merit, it may be very relevant to know 
whether the lessee’s lack of drilling during the challenge to the lease 
constitutes a breach—perhaps even a breach that would justify lease 
termination. If the original challenge to the lease is brought during the 
primary term, at a time when the lessee has not yet established production, 
a somewhat similar question can arise. If the primary term ends while the 
challenge to the lease is pending, will the lease terminate for a lack of 
production in paying quantities if the lessee refrains from drilling during 
the lease challenge?
In most states that have significant oil and gas jurisprudence, case law 
protects the lessee by extending the primary term (if a challenge to the 
                                                                                                        
214. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. App. 1927); 
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. App. 1925).
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lease occurs during the primary term)215 and by providing that the lessee’s 
implied covenant duties are suspended while a suit is pending in which the 
lessor alleges that the lease has terminated or requests termination as a 
remedy.216
Such jurisprudence seems appropriate. Given the substantial costs of 
drilling and completing wells, and the economic risks inherent in almost 
any drilling project, it generally would be unfair to expect a lessee to drill 
on the leased premises while a challenge to the lease is pending. In such 
cases, it simply is not prudent or practical for the lessee to engage in 
drilling. This is true whether the challenge to the lease is brought by the 
lessor or some other person, but when the challenge is asserted by the 
lessor, it would be doubly unfair to expect the lessee to conduct drilling or 
other significant operations while the challenge is pending. In such cases 
(and remember, we are now considering cases in which the original 
challenge to the lease lacked merit), the lessor himself has interfered with 
the lessee’s rights and created the circumstances that make it impractical 
for the lessee to drill. The lessor should not be allowed to profit from its 
own erroneous challenge.
Moreover, if the law did not excuse a lessee from any expectation of 
drilling wells during a challenge to the validity of the lease, a lessee would 
sometimes be put in the position that, in order to protect its rights or fulfill 
its contractual obligations, it must go onto the lessor’s property to drill a 
well in direct defiance of the lessor’s claim that the lessee is trespassing 
on the property and has no right to be there. This risks an escalation of 
disputes.
Finally, it is notable that, if a lessor seeks termination of a lease as a 
remedy because the lessee allegedly breached the lease by failing to drill 
during the original challenge to the lease, the lessee would be seeking an 
equitable remedy. Equity seeks to do justice and achieve fairness. It can 
hardly be said to be just or fair to reward a lessor for bringing a lease 
challenge that lacks merit, thereby effectively punishing the lessee who 
was the victim of the original, meritless challenge. These are the reasons 
why states that have addressed the issue have been virtually unanimous in 
concluding that the lessee’s implied covenant duties are suspended during 
                                                                                                        
215. Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (La. 1953); Sw. Energy Prod. 
Co. v. Elkins, 2010 Ark. 481, 374 S.W.3d 678, 685 (2010); Greer v. Carter Oil 
Co., 373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1940); cf. Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 
56, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957); Bingham v. Stevenson, 148 Mont. 209, 420 P.2d 839, 
842 (1966).
216. See, e.g., Spaeth v. Union Oil Co., 710 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(Oklahoma law); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 938-9 (Okla. 
1943).
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the time that the lessor challenges the lease, and that the primary term is 
extended.
But at least one state has staked out a contrary position, at least with 
respect to the question of whether the primary term is extended. In 
Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., an oil and gas lessor filed suit during 
the primary term, alleging that the lease had been fraudulently induced and 
therefore was invalid.217 Approximately two days before the end of the 
primary term, the federal district court issued a summary judgment 
dismissing the lessor’s claims, stating that he had “not offered any 
evidence” to support his claim.218 But the district court refused to extend 
the primary term.219 The lessee appealed to the United States Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which certified a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court as to whether Pennsylvania follows the so-called repudiation 
doctrine, also sometimes called the lessor-interference doctrine, which 
provides that the primary term of a lease is extended when a lessor file suit 
challenging the validity of a lease.220 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
accepted the certified question, then held that, under Pennsylvania law, a 
lessor’s filing and prosecution of an action asserting that a lease is invalid 
is not sufficient to justify an extension of the primary term.221
Of course, Harrison dealt only with the question of whether the
primary term of a lease would be extended, not whether a lessee’s implied 
covenant duties would be suspended. Sound arguments exist for the 
proposition that implied covenant duties should be suspended, even if the 
primary term is not extended. For example, Harrison’s refusal to extend 
the primary term was merely a refusal to use the unfairness of lessor’s 
erroneous challenge to a lease as grounds to modify the lease (by 
                                                                                                        
217. 110 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2015).
218. Harrison v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 588, 594 (M.D. 
Pa.) (the judgment is dated August 14, 2012, whereas the lease, which had a five-
year primary term, was signed on August 16, 2007).
219. Id. at 597.
220. Harrison v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 110 A.3d 178, 179 (Pa. 2015).
221. Id. at 185. The court said that it would not rule out an equitable extension 
of the primary term if the lessor made a more “affirmative repudiation of a lease” 
than merely filing a suit alleging that the lease was unenforceable because 
allegedly it had been fraudulently induced. Id. at 186. Many observers might 
conclude that such a lawsuit is an affirmative repudiation of the lease. Perhaps 
one of the types of action that the court would consider a more affirmative 
repudiation than such a lawsuit would be a lessor’s “affirmative” refusal to allow 
the lessee to enter the property. See id. at 186, n.6.
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extending the primary term).222 But if a court imposed liability on a lessee 
for “breaching” implied covenant duties by failing to drill wells during the 
time when the lessor himself makes such drilling impractical, such a 
holding could be remarkably unfair. Further, although damages are 
sometimes awarded as a remedy for breach of an implied covenant, it is 
notable that a common form of remedy is a form of equitable relief, 
forfeiture of the lease. Given that equity generally abhors a forfeiture, it 
would be odd for a court to exercise its equitable powers by terminating a 
lease in these circumstances, thereby punishing the lessee that is the victim 
of the lessor’s initial, erroneous challenge to the lease, and allowing the 
lessor to benefit from his erroneous challenge. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that a lessor may attempt to extend 
Harrison, citing it as support for an argument that implied covenant duties 
should not be suspended during an erroneous challenge to a lease.
Accordingly, lessees should consider including in their leases a clause that 
expressly suspends implied covenant duties for a period in which a lessor 
seeks lease termination or asserts that the lease already has terminated.
Such a clause could also provide for an extension of the primary term. (In 
Harrison, the court asserted that the lessee should have bargained for such 
a clause.) A lease form commonly used in Louisiana states:
Should the right or interest of Lessee hereunder be disputed by 
Lessor, or any other person, the time covered by the pendency of 
such dispute shall not be counted against Lessee either as affecting 
the term of the lease or for any other purpose, and Lessee may 
suspend all payments without interest until there is a final 
adjudication or other determination of such dispute.223
Such language might work, but it does not expressly provide for a 
suspension of implied covenants. Something like the following language 
would be more explicit:
If the Lessee or any other person seeks termination of the Lease 
(in whole or part) or asserts that that the Lease is not valid or not 
enforceable (in whole or part), any implied covenant duties will 
be suspended during such a challenge to the Lease. Further, any 
time during which a court action, arbitration, or regulatory 
                                                                                                        
222. This statement is not intended to diminish the unfairness of allowing the 
lessor in Harrison to benefit from its wrongful filing of a lawsuit that alleged fraud 
even though the lessor had no evidence of fraud.
223. The quoted language comes from paragraph 11 of Bath’s Form Louisiana 
Spec. 14-BR1-2A/12/79, which is available from M.L. Bath Company Ltd., Inc. 
in Shreveport, Louisiana.
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challenge to the Lease is pending, shall not be counted against the 
Lessee for purposes of the Lease, including, but not limited to, the 
running of the time allowed for the primary term, any time periods 
allowed under any saving clauses, and the time limits (if any) on 
the duration of any force majeure situation or application of a shut-
in well clause.
A much lengthier, but even more explicit clause might read:
While a Lease Termination Action is pending,224 the Lessee will 
not have any implied covenant obligations225 with respect to any 
portion of the Leased Premises where the Lessor or some other 
person contends the Lease should be terminated, cancelled, or 
forfeited, or where the Lessor or some other person contends the 
Lease already is void, unenforceable or has terminated. Further, if 
a Lease Termination Action is asserted during the primary term of 
the Lease, the primary term will be extended by the length of time 
that the Lease Termination Action is pending. Similarly, whether 
a Lease Termination Action is asserted during or after the primary 
term, the time during which a Lease Termination Action is 
pending will not count against the Lessee for purposes of any time 
limit to act to maintain this Lease under a lease savings clause or 
for any other purpose, except that the time for payment of any 
lease royalties on actual production will not be delayed if there is 
no dispute regarding what person is entitled to receive such 
payments.226 For purposes of this clause, a “Lease Termination 
Action” is a lawsuit, arbitration, or similar proceeding in which 
Lessor or some other person contends: that the Lease (in whole or 
part) is void, invalid, abandoned, or otherwise unenforceable; that 
the Lease (in whole or part) is no longer valid and enforceable; or 
that the Lease (in whole or part) should be terminated, cancelled, 
                                                                                                        
224. The lessee should consider whether this clause should be broadened to 
cover both circumstances in which a suit has been filed and circumstances in 
which a suit has not been filed, but the lessor or some other person has challenged 
the lease.
225. The lessee should consider whether there are any express obligations that 
should be suspended.
226. The lessee should consider whether there are any other time limits that 
should be extended during the pendency of a Lease Termination Action. If so, 
perhaps the lease should expressly note that those time periods will be extended 
also. For example, if a lease limits the length of time that a lessee can rely on a 
force majeure clause or a shut-in clause, the lessee might want for the lease to 
expressly provide that such time is extended during a Lease Termination Action.
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or forfeited as a form of remedy or relief.
7. Clause Providing for a General Waiver of Implied Covenants
A prospective lessee that wishes to protect itself from implied 
covenant claims could consider bargaining for a clause that disclaims all 
implied covenants. As previously discussed in this Article, it is well-
accepted that the express terms of a lease can preclude the existence of an 
implied covenant. Courts from several jurisdictions have stated this.
Typically, such statements are made in cases that involve a lease that 
imposes some express duty, and the court is addressing whether the 
express duty precludes the existence of an implied covenant that imposes 
a particular duty. For example, a court might consider whether an express 
offset well clause precludes the existence of an implied covenant to protect 
against drainage. There are far fewer cases involving leases that purport to 
eliminate all implied covenants. But there a handful of such cases from 
Ohio.
For example, a lease at issue in Bilbaran Farm, Inc. v. Bakerwell, Inc.
contained a clause stating:
This lease contains all of the agreements and understandings of 
the Lessor and the Lessee respecting the subject matter hereof and 
no implied covenants or obligations, or verbal representations or 
promises, have been made or relied upon by Lessor or Lessee 
supplementing or modifying this lease or as an inducement 
thereto. 227
The lessee was operating three wells on the approximately 276-acre 
property covered by the lease, but a portion of the property had not been 
developed.228 The lessor brought suit in state court in Ohio, asserting that 
the lessee had breached the implied covenant to fully develop the property.
The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint 
failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the motion and 
the appellate court affirmed, holding that the lease’s general waiver 
precluded the existence of an implied covenant to develop the property.229
In doing so, the appellate court from Ohio’s Fifth District rejected the 
lessor’s argument that the lessee’s failure to further develop the property 
was “unfair and inequitable.”230 The court noted that parties generally have 
                                                                                                        
227. 993 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.).
228. Id. at 799. 
229. Id. at 801. 
230. Id.
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freedom of contract and that courts typically should not override the terms 
of a contract.231 The court also cited a prior case that reached a similar 
result.232
That prior case was Bushman v. MFC Drilling, an unpublished case 
from the Ninth District Court of Appeals.233 The parties in Bushman
entered a lease in 1990 that covered about twenty-seven acres. About ten 
of those acres were part of a drilling unit that contained a unit well that 
produced in paying quantities.234 The lessor brought suit, arguing that the 
lessee had breached an implied covenant to reasonably develop the 
property because seventeen acres remained undeveloped. The lessee 
moved for summary judgment, noting that a clause in the lease stated, “It 
is mutually agreed that this instrument contains and expresses all of the 
agreements and understandings of the parties in regard to the subject 
matter thereof, and no implied covenant, agreement or obligation shall be 
read into this agreement or imposed upon the parties or either of them.”235
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the lessor’s claims. On 
appeal, the lessor argued that “public policy prohibits a general disclaimer 
of the implied covenant to develop the leased property.”236 Thus, only a 
clause that referred specifically to the implied covenant to develop the 
leased premises could preclude the existence of such a covenant. Here, 
asserted the lessor, the clause disclaiming implied covenants was too 
“vague and general” to preclude the existence of an implied covenant. The 
appellate court disagreed, concluding that, under Ohio contract law, a 
general waiver should be sufficient and that no authority called for a 
different result to apply for an oil and gas lease.237 The lessor in Bushman
also argued that, under the facts of the case, a general waiver of the implied 
covenant to develop the premises was unconscionable. Relying on general 
principles of contract law, the appellate court rejected this argument too.238
Appellate courts from two additional appellate districts have likewise 
concluded that general waivers of implied covenants are enforceable.239
                                                                                                        
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 1995 WL 434409 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1995). 
234. Id. at *1. 
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *3.
239. See Belmont Hills Country Club v. Beck Energy, 2015 WL 1592999 
(Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2015); Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 26 
N.E.3d 1176, 1186 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2014); Taylor v. MFC Drilling, Inc., 
1995 WL 89710 (Ohio Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1995) (general waiver of implied 
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Further, in two recent cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that 
general waivers of implied covenants are enforceable. One of these was 
Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., though the statement in that 
case was dicta.240 The other case was State ex rel. Claugus Family Farm, 
L.P. v. Seventh District Court of Appeals.241 In Claugus, the court stated 
that there would not be an implied covenant of reasonable development 
because the lease stated a period within which development must begin.
The court then stated, “In addition, there is specific language in the lease 
that disclaims any implied covenant.”242 The court then declared, “For 
these reasons, we hold that . . . the leases preclude the imposition of an 
implied covenant of develop within the primary term of the lease.”243
These cases from multiple appellate districts, combined with the 
statements from the Ohio Supreme Court, should suffice to make a general 
waiver enforceable anywhere in that state.
In contrast to Ohio, most states do not have any cases that address a 
general waiver of all implied covenants. As previously noted, though, 
courts from several jurisdictions have stated that express lease clauses can 
negate the existence of an implied covenant. Further, some states have 
cases holding that a lease clause need not expressly negate an implied 
covenant in order to preclude the existence of such a covenant. Instead, it 
is sufficient that an express clause addresses the same type of performance 
as that which is covered by the implied covenant. Thus, a clause that 
expressly imposes a duty to drill a specified number of wells may preclude
the existence of an implied covenant of reasonable development. Such 
cases could be cited in support of the proposition that a general waiver of 
implied covenants is enforceable.
The only potential hurdle to the enforceability of a general waiver of 
all implied covenants would be a conclusion by a court in some 
jurisdiction that public policy so favors the protection of lessees that a 
general wavier should not be enforced. But the authorities previously 
cited, along with a general public policy favoring freedom of contract, 
would weigh in favor of the enforcement of a general waiver of all implied 
covenants.
Nevertheless, a state appellate court in Louisiana stated that, for 
reasons of public policy, the parties to a lease do not have the contractual 
freedom to preclude altogether the implied covenant of reasonable 
                                                                                                        
covenants was effective); Holonko v. Collins, 1988 WL 70900 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th 
Dist. 1988) (same).
240. 95 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2018).
241. 47 N.E.3d 836, 843 (Ohio 2016).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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development.244 But it is not clear that the statement is a correct expression 
of Louisiana law, much less the law of any other jurisdiction, and the 
statement certainly was dicta. The case did not even involve a lease that 
purported to eliminate the implied covenant of reasonable development or 
to eliminate all implied covenants. Instead, it involved a retained acreage 
clause. Further, a Louisiana Supreme Court case cited by the appellate 
court merely said that “it would require a very clear and unmistakable 
contract” to preclude a duty to drill and market, not that public policy 
would bar enforcement of a clause that disclaimed implied covenants.245
8. Clause Making an Express Disclaimer of Specific Implied 
Covenants
Rather than disclaiming all implied covenants, a lease could disclaim 
one or more specific implied covenants. Some leases do this by expressly 
imposing upon the lessee a specifically defined duty involving the same 
type of performance as is required by one of the implied covenants, but 
without expressly disclaiming the implied covenant. It seems that 
relatively few leases contain a clause that expressly precludes specific 
implied covenants. Certainly, few cases deal with an express waiver of a 
specific implied covenant, but one such case is Linn v. Wehrle.246 In Linn,
a lessor brought suit, asserting that the lessee had breached the implied 
covenant to protect against drainage, but the lease expressly stated that 
“there shall be no implied covenant to drill or protect lines” (to “protect 
lines” was to protect against drainage). A state appellate court from Ohio 
held that this clause precluded the existence of an implied covenant to drill 
or protect against drainage. The parties to an oil and gas lease could use 
similar language to expressly preclude one or more implied covenants.
Parties should also keep in mind that some court decisions hold that a 
lease clause that expressly imposes a particular type of duty will preclude 
the existence of an implied covenant for the same type of performance.
                                                                                                        
244. Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
245. Id. at 1211 (citing Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co., 87 So. 265 (La. 1921)). 
The state appellate court also cited a United States Fifth Circuit case, but the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting as an Erie court, merely stated that “[i]t would require a clear and 
unequivocal clause in a lease” to preclude implied covenants. Id. (citing Williams 
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970)).
246. 172 N.E.2d 288, 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1928).
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9. Restriction of Marketing Covenant
Traditionally, the implied covenant to diligently market required the 
lessee to diligently seek a market and perhaps to seek the best price 
reasonably available. In some states, however, courts have held that the 
implied covenant to diligently market requires the lessee to absorb the 
entirety of so-called post-production costs, unless the royalty clause in the 
lease expressly provides to the contrary.
This issue arises most often with respect to the lease royalties to be 
paid on natural gas. As noted in the “Primer” Section of this Article, the
royalty clauses of many oil and gas leases provide for a royalty on natural 
gas to be paid based on the value of gas at the wellhead (or based on the 
amount received on the sale of the gas, but “calculated at the wellhead”). 
In the past, gas often was sold at or near the wellhead, and the calculation 
of the royalty was straightforward. But now, natural gas is often sold at a 
market a great distance away. Further, after the gas is brought to the 
surface at the well, but before the gas is sold at a market some distance 
away, the lessee often incurs “post-production” costs for tasks that 
increase the value of the gas.
This leads to disputes regarding how to calculate the royalty. Lessees 
typically use a “workback” method, estimating the value at the well as 
being equal to the ultimate sales price, minus any post-production costs. 
This method is accepted in several states, but in some jurisdictions lessors 
have successfully argued that the implied covenant to diligently market 
requires the lessee to absorb the entirety of post-production costs, or at 
least those costs necessary to make the gas “marketable,” even if that 
means the royalty is calculated based on a sales price that is greater than 
the value that the gas had at the well. The lessee obviously would prefer 
to avoid this result.
Under the basic tenets of implied covenant law, parties should be able 
to preclude the existence of any implied covenant with express language 
in the lease. Thus, in states that have held that the implied covenant to 
diligently market generally precludes use of the workback method, lessees 
who wish to pay a royalty based on the value of gas at the well should 
include in the lease language that specifically provides for the royalty on 
natural gas to be paid based on a sales price minus any post-production 
costs incurred up until the time of sale. Such a clause might read (assuming 
for purposes of this example a 20% royalty):
The royalty to be paid on natural gas that is produced and sold will 
be one-fifth of the difference between the sales price and the post-
production costs that the lessee incurs for the gathering, 
dehydration, sweetening, treatment, compression, and transport of 
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such natural gas. The lessee will not be bound by an implied 
covenant or obligation to absorb all costs up to the point that the 
gas becomes marketable or to pay a royalty based on the price or 
value of natural gas after the gas has been made marketable.247
B. Clauses to Benefit Lessors
Like lessees, lessors also can bargain for lease clauses that will provide 
greater protection to them than would be provided by implied covenants 
jurisprudence. Arguably, such clauses are outside the scope of an “implied 
covenant” topic because the clauses that would provide such protection to 
lessors typically either establish: express covenants; or convert the type of 
performance that otherwise would have an implied covenant into a 
limitation or condition, rather than a covenant. Nevertheless, because the 
clauses that benefit lessors are closely related to the topic of implied 
covenants, and often will have the effect of precluding the existence of an 
implied covenant, some of the types of clauses that could benefit a lessor 
are discussed below.
1. Termination if Breach is Not Corrected Within Specified Time of 
Occurrence of Breach
Lessors can use lease language to provide themselves with greater 
protection or benefits than are supplied under jurisprudentially-recognized 
implied covenants. They can do so by imposing express duties that either 
replace or supplement the implied covenants or by using express clauses 
to convert the implied covenants from mere covenants to either conditions 
or limitations.248 For example, a lessor could propose language that 
provides that the lease terminates automatically if the breach of an implied 
                                                                                                        
247. The language above is not quoted from a case or from an actual lease. 
The language was drafted by the author of this Article. Others may be able to 
improve on this language.
248. By definition, lessors generally cannot use lease language to obtain 
greater protection from implied covenants than is provided by the 
jurisprudentially-recognized implied covenants. If a lessor uses the lease to 
expressly impose certain duties, those duties are express covenants, not implied 
covenants. If a lessor includes in the lease language that provides for automatic 
termination if a breach of an implied covenant occurs or if a breach is not 
corrected within a certain time, that language converts the implied covenant into 
a condition or limitation. Here, by “limitation,” the author refers to an event or 
circumstance that leads to automatic termination of the lease, without any action 
of the lessor. A “condition” would be an event or circumstance that makes the 
lease subject to termination at the option of the lessor.
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covenant is not corrected within a certain amount of time from the first 
date on which the lessee had an implied duty to act. For example, such a 
clause might read:
Whenever the lessee is bound by an implied covenant, this lease 
will terminate unless the lessee takes the actions that a reasonably 
prudent operator would take within ninety days after the first 
existence of circumstances that give rise to an implied duty to 
act.249
A clause specifically directed to the duty to protect against drainage might 
read:
If production from a well on lands other than the leased premises 
begins draining hydrocarbons from beneath the leased premises, 
this lease will terminate unless the lessor commences action to 
protect the leased premises from drainage within ninety days of 
the start of the drainage.250
Of course, a lessee should try to avoid the use of such lease clauses.
Assuming the lessor bargains for such a clause and has the bargaining 
power to obtain the lessee’s consent, the lessee should make sure that the 
clause gives the lessee an adequate time to act after the duty to act arises.
Otherwise, the lessee would have to anticipate potential duties in advance 
of the duties arising. 
2. Termination if Breach Not Cured or Cure Not Commenced Within 
Specified Time of Demand for Cure
Rather than providing for automatic termination if the lessee does not 
act within a specified time of a duty to act arising, a lessor could bargain 
for a clause that provides for automatic termination or termination at the 
option of the lessor if the lessee does not correct a breach within a specified 
time of the lessor giving the lessee notice of the breach. Such a clause 
might read:
                                                                                                        
249. This language does not come from an actual lease. It was drafted for 
purposes of illustration by the author. Others may be able to improve on this 
language.
250. This language does not come from an actual lease. It was drafted for 
purposes of illustration by the author. Others may be able to improve on this 
language. If the lessor does not own mineral rights at all depths, the lessor should 
consider use of a clause that requires protection against drainage from wells 
drilled at depths above or below the depths where the lessor has rights.
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If the Lessee shall fail for a period of sixty (60) days after written 
notice given to it by the Lessor to comply with any provision of
this lease, the Lessor may, at his option, terminate this lease.251
If a lessor bargains for such a clause, it should consider replacing 
“provision” with “express or implied covenant” or some similar language 
to make clear that the clause applies to implied covenant duties, not just 
express lease provisions.
3. Express Clauses that Specify Certain Duties
Implied covenants provide some protection or benefits to lessors.
Lessors can obtain additional protection by negotiating for express lease 
clauses that either replace or supplement particular implied covenants.
Because such clauses impose express duties, and because this Article deals 
with implied covenants, this Article will not attempt to address in any 
detail the clauses that a lessor may wish to include in a lease. Nevertheless, 
this Section of this Article will briefly identify some of the substantive 
clauses that a lessor might wish to consider that modify, supplement, or 
relate most closely to the types of duties imposed by implied covenants. 
For example, to encourage more exploration or development, 
prospective lessors can negotiate for a Pugh Clause. Such a clause alters 
the general rule regarding the effect production (and drilling) from a 
pooled unit. Under the default rule, production in paying quantities from a 
pooled unit that includes a portion of the leased premises will be sufficient 
to maintain the entire lease, even if portions of the leased premises are not 
included in the unit. A Pugh Clause provides that production from a pooled 
unit will not maintain the lease as to any areas that are outside the unit. A
Pugh Clause can have the effect of encouraging additional drilling by the 
lessee in order to maintain the lease as to areas outside the pooled unit.
The following is an example of a Pugh Clause that was contained in a 
lease in Texas:
In the event a portion or portions of the land herein leased is 
pooled or unitized with other land so as to form a pooled unit or 
units, operations on, completion of a well upon, or production 
from such unit or units will not maintain this lease in force as to 
the land not included in such unit or units. The lease may be 
maintained in force as to any land covered hereby and not included 
                                                                                                        
251. This clause appeared in Renner v. Huntington Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 
238 P.2d 35 (Cal. App. 1951), vacated by 244 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1952). See also
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.1.
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in such unit or units in any manner provided for herein; provided 
that if it be by rental payments, rentals shall be reduced in 
proportion to the number of acres covered hereby and included in 
such unit or units.252
There is no standard language for a Pugh Clause. Thus, the parties should 
carefully consider the effect of the language used with respect to questions 
such as: whether the Pugh Clause applies with respect to any unit well or 
only unit wells not located on the leased premises; and whether the Pugh 
Clause applies only when a unit includes both a portion of the leased 
premises and also lands not covered by the lease, or whether the Pugh 
Clause also will apply in the event that all the lands in the unit are covered 
by the lease.
Prospective lessors should note that a Pugh Clause does not limit the 
lease maintenance effect of a well that is not a unit well. Thus, if a well that 
is not a unit well is located on the leased premises and is producing in paying 
quantities, that well will maintain the entire lease. A prospective lessor may 
want to consider negotiating for a lease clause that limits the lease 
maintenance effect of a well that is not a unit well to a specified area. That 
area could be a set number of acres or it could be based on the spacing rules 
that apply in the area. For example, the lease maintenance effect of a lease 
would be limited to 160 acres. The next question to answer would be the 
boundaries of the area. One possibility is for the lease clause to require the 
lessee to designate, within a specified time, the area that will be maintained 
by production from the well. Other alternatives are to provide that a well 
will not maintain the lease as to any area outside the governmental survey 
section (if the well will be allowed to maintain 640 acres) or quarter section 
(if the well will be allowed to maintain 160 acres) where the well is located. 
But lessees should be wary of such a clause that is based on governmental 
survey areas. Depending on the location of the well relative lease lines and 
the section or quarter section boundary lines, limiting the effect of lease
maintenance in such a way might yield odd results.
Alternatively, if a lessor has the bargaining power, it can seek to have the 
lease specify a minimum number of wells that must be drilled with a certain 
time. Or, the lease could require a new well be started with a specified amount 
of time from the completion of the prior well. The lease could provide that 
once the lessee fails to begin a new well within the specified time, the lease 
will terminate as to all areas not within either a pooled unit that has production 
in paying quantities or within a specified area around any well that is 
producing in paying quantities that is not a unit well.
                                                                                                        
252. Friedrich v. Amoco Production Co., 698 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App. 1985).
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A lessor should also consider limiting the effect of lease maintenance 
by depth. Under the general rule, production in paying quantities from 
anywhere on the lease will maintain the entire lease—both as to areal 
coverage and as to all depths. That is, production that maintains the lease 
as to a certain area on a map would maintain the lease as to all depths 
beneath that area. Both a traditional Pugh Clause and the type of clause 
discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph modify the general rule 
by restricting the effect of lease maintenance, but the restriction only 
applies to the areal extent of lease maintenance. In contrast, a “horizontal 
Pugh Clause” regulates and limits the lease maintenance effect of 
production or drilling by depth. The following language is an example of 
a lease clause that combines a traditional Pugh clause with a horizontal 
Pugh Clause, with the horizontal Pugh Clause language being showing in 
italics:
This lease shall expire at the end of the primary term hereof or any 
extension thereof by reason of operations being conducted at the 
end of the primary term hereof as to all land outside any pooled 
and/or proration unit assigned to any well theretofore completed 
as a well capable of producing oil and/or gas and also shall expire 
as to all depths below the deepest depth drilled theretofore 
established in a well located on lands covered by this lease.253
A horizontal Pugh Clause can encourage the lessee to explore or develop 
the leased premises at deeper depths.
Given that many states allow the use of the workback method for 
calculating the royalty on natural gas, a lessor may wish to negotiate for 
the royalty clause to provide that the royalty will be based on the price 
obtained in the first arms-length sale of the gas or perhaps the first sale to 
a buyer that is not an affiliate of the lessee.
In addition, prospective lessors may wish to negotiate for an offset 
well covenant. An offset well covenant is a clause in a lease that requires 
the lessee to drill an offset well in the event that a well located within a 
specified distance of the leased premises begins producing oil or gas. Such 
a covenant can provide protection to the lessor by imposing a requirement 
on the lessee to drill a well, even without the lessor necessarily having to 
prove that a reasonably prudent operator would drill such a well in order 
to protect against drainage. If the parties agree to such a clause, the clause 
should address issues as:
                                                                                                        
253. Albert v. Dunlap Exploration, Inc., 457 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. App. 
2015).
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How close must a well on a neighboring tract be from the leased 
premises in order to trigger the offset well covenant?
Is the specified distance based on the surface location of the 
neighboring well, the wellbore’s nearest approach to the leased 
premises, the perforation of the wellbore that is closed to the 
leased premises?
Is the distance the same for oil wells versus gas wells?
Does the distance depend on whether the well has been 
hydraulically fractured? and
Is it necessary that there be drainage in order for the express offset 
clause to apply?
The following is an example of an offset well covenant:
In the event a well or wells producing oil or gas in paying 
quantities should be brought in on adjacent lands and within one 
hundred fifty (150) feet of and draining the leased premises, lessee 
agrees to drill such offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator 
would drill under the same or similar circumstances.254
Lessors should note, however, that this clause is probably too narrow to 
provide much protection, and that the lessor therefore likely would want 
to modify the language. There are several reasons why this clause provides 
very little protection for the lessor. First, the spacing or setback rules of 
many states will require a well to be more than 150 feet from a lease line, 
so few wells will trigger the clause. Second, the clause only requires the 
lessee to drill offset wells that a reasonably prudent operator would drill.
Thus, the clause adds nothing to the duties that would be imposed by an 
implied covenant to protect against drainage. Further, the existence of an 
express offset well covenant might prompt a court to conclude that the 
express covenant precludes the existence of an implied covenant. If that 
happens, the lessee might have a narrower duty to protect against drainage 
                                                                                                        
254. Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 161 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App. 
1942). An express offset well covenant in a Louisiana lease form contains almost 
identical language. Paragraph 9 of Bath’s Form Louisiana Spec. 14-BR1-
2A/12/79, which is available from M.L. Bath Company Ltd., Inc. in Shreveport, 
Louisiana, states:
In the event a well or wells, producing oil, gas, casinghead gas or 
condensate in paying quantities should be brought in on adjacent lands 
not owned by the Lessor and within one hundred fifty feet of and 
draining the leased premises, Lessee agrees to drill such offset well or 
wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under the same or 
similar circumstances.
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than if the lease lacked an express well covenant because an implied 
covenant to protect against drainage often would require the lessee to 
provide more protection against drainage than is required by the above-
quoted express offset well covenant.
From the standpoint of the lessor, a much better example of an offset 
well covenant is quoted in Adams v. Murphy Exploration and Production 
Co.-USA.255 In that case, an express offset well covenant imposes duties 
on the lessee whenever “a well is completed as a producer of oil and/or 
gas on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased premises, and within 467 
feet of the premises covered by this lease.” Note that, under this clause, 
the lessee’s duties are triggered by a well much further from the leased 
premises than in the other example quoted above. Further, the triggering 
of the lessee’s duty does not depend on whether a reasonably prudent 
operator would drill an offset well.
If the lessor only owns minerals as to certain depths, the lessor may 
wish to include lease language that ensures that the duty to protect against 
drainage and any offset well duty applies so as to protect the leased area 
against drainage from a well located at a different depth, and not merely 
to protect against drainage from a well located beneath a neighboring tract 
of land.
In addition, given that most states that have addressed the issue have 
rejected an implied covenant of surface restoration, prospective lessors 
may wish for a clause that requires the lessee to take reasonable steps to 
restore the surface to its original condition after the lease terminates and 
possibly also during the life of the lease as to areas where drilling or 
production is no longer active. This could include a duty to remove 
equipment, tanks, piping, and concrete slabs, and to fill any pits and 
perhaps restore sod or other vegetation. 
Finally, if a lessor does negotiate to include such clauses in a lease, 
the lessor should keep in mind that courts typically hold that a lease clause 
that addresses a particular type of duty (such as by imposing a specific 
duty) will have the effect of precluding any implied covenant, even if the 
clause does not expressly negate the implied covenant. Thus, the express 
clause might replace the implied covenant, rather than supplementing it.
For this reason, the lessor should consider some language to provide that 
the implied covenants that otherwise would exist are not negated. Such a 
clause might be an introductory phrase to a clause imposing a specific 
duty, with the introductory phrase stating something like, “Without 
negating the existence of any implied covenant that otherwise would exist, 
                                                                                                        
255. 497 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016), rev'd, 560 S.W.3d 105 
(Tex. 2018), opinion corrected and superseded (Nov. 30, 2018).
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the parties hereby agree that . . . .” Or, the parties could supplement the 
express duty with a duty to also take the steps that a reasonably prudent 
operator would take. For example, after specifying express offset duties, 
the lease could include a clause stating, “In addition, the lessee will drill 
any additional offset wells or take other appropriate steps to protect against 
drainage to the extent that a reasonably prudent operator would.”
CONCLUSION
Implied covenants are obligations that are not expressly stated in an 
oil and gas lease, but that are nevertheless binding on lessees. Some of the 
most significant implied covenant obligations require a lessee to develop 
proven formations, explore new areas, protect the leased premises against 
drainage, and diligently market any oil and gas discovered to the extent 
that a reasonably prudent operator would. Parties can supersede or 
supplement implied covenants with express lease clauses.
